Category: philosophy

Evil: Remorse and Moral Understanding (Gaita 2)

I am envisioning four or five posts on Raimond Gaita’s book, Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception (Routledge, 2nd edition, 2004).  This is the second of those posts.

The topic today (and in at least one subsequent post) is how Gaita thinks one might achieve moral understanding, where that understanding is 1) a realization of the other’s preciousness (with the corollary of understanding evil as treating a person in a way that violates his/her preciousness) and 2) not a kind of knowledge, i.e. not a fact owned as an intellectual possession (the way I know that Paris is the largest city in France), but instead is experienced as an orientation, a fundamental disposition, that infuses everything I think and do and feel.  It is primary and absolute, the most important determinant of how I am in the world, of how I treat others, and of how I understand myself. 

Since it is obvious that many people lack that understanding, that they treat others as mere things, there must be some way to think about how one might be moved from dispositional states that enable evil deeds (where evil is defined as mistreating others either physically or psychologically.)  James Baldwin speaks in his essay “Equal in Paris” of those for whom “the pain of the living is not real.”  Gaita associates evil with exactly the sort of imaginative lack that Baldwin notes. We might, following Wittgenstein, call this failure “aspect blindness.”  Evil is done by those who blind themselves, either willfully or involuntarily, to the reality of the other person as fully human, fully capable of the kinds of pain, aspirations, goodness, and worth as myself.  One way that Gaita expresses this idea is to say moral understanding recognizes the other “as an intelligible object of someone’s love” (146).  {I will, inspired in part by Baldwin, want to talk about “hate” presently.}

Gaita offers three ways in which someone who lacks that imaginative grasp of the other as fully human might come to understand it. 1) Remorse; 2) example of goodness; 3) “conversation.”  I will be examining each of these in turn.  From the outset, let it be noted that stated baldly each of these looks remarkably feeble.  How could they even remotely be up to the task?  But think about the usual recourses in efforts to “convert” the perpetrator of evil.  Here’s the four I can think of.

1)Moral injunctions, stated either as commandments or principles.

2) Legal constraints, i.e. sets of strictures that attempt to establish guardrails against various kinds of behavior deemed unacceptable/harmful, underwritten by sanctions against those who trespass against those strictures.

3) Persuasion via rational argumentation (i.e. moral philosophies that set out to “demonstrate” by one means or another) that evil is bad, so you shouldn’t do it.

4)Violent coercion, either through various forms of punishment (exile, confinement [prison], ostracism, or corporeal harm) or through extermination (execution, war).

The limits of #3, persuasion, are all too obvious.  #4, Violence, doesn’t so much address the conversion issue as conclude, despairingly, that no conversion is possible, so evil doers must not be tolerated and should be punished—with the well known effect that violence becomes reciprocal and escalates.  Violence does not solve anything; it just leads to more violence.  #2, legal constraints, are an attempt to structure coercions in ways that stop short of violence in at least some cases (where voluntary compliance can be achieved for the vast majority) and to establish safeguards against arbitrary exercises of power.  The “rule of law” is not to be sneezed at; in a highly imperfect world, the law is about the best expedient we have come up with to reign in some of human beings’ worst impulses/failings.  The chaos endemic to “failed states” makes the achievements of legal realms precious.  But the ability—and endless efforts—of people to twist the law to their own advantage means that it is very hard to credit the law with the kinds of “moral understanding” that Gaita aspires to.  The law is always only a “second best,” a prudent response to the despairing conclusion that humans are everywhere prone to evil and that we need to safeguard against that proclivity. And it prove a tricky task, one that is very often not successfully achieved, to keep the law from being simply a disguised and apparently more “civil” version of violence. The link between the law and punishment is the bridge from the legal to the violent. Finessing that connection is difficult indeed–especially for someone, like me, who wants to believe that the law does not necessarily reduce to violence, that it can have a legitimacy and an efficacy separate from its deployment of violence in certain instances. Finally, #1, moral injunctions (whether arrived at through philosophical reasoning such as found in Kant or Bentham, or announced as commandments that come from on high) hardly seem very effective when weighed against the atrocities of human history.  Ages of faith (such as the Middle Ages are sometimes claimed to be) hardly seem more free of abuses of fellow humans by the faithful than ages deemed decadent because obedience to divine commandments is lacking. No set of beliefs in either principles developed by moral philosophy or in commandments proffered by religion seems to insure virtue or to prevent doing grevious harm to others. As is often noted, such principles and commandments are all too often used to justify harming others–as heretics, reprobates, or not fully human.

In short, Gaita’s list of transformative possibilities only looks excessively feeble if we have some exalted (and, to my mind, unrealistic) idea of other possible means of moving the evil-doer to goodness.  It is certainly worth noting that Gaita’s bias here is very individualistic.  His antipathy to “principle” and to rationalist arguments means that he is uninterested in general remedies, eschewing (quite explicitly) what might be called “systematic” or “overarching” approaches.

This individualistic bias is, in fact, central to his whole approach to morality.  The preciousness of the other can only, for Gaita, be experienced meaningfully in the individual instance.  We experience (understand) humanity’s preciousness only through the encounter with an individual we recognize as precious.  He has no truck with generalized sentiments about universal brotherhood or loving all human kind. He deems those notions “sentimental” and is scathing throughout his book about the delusional, self-deceiving, and non-lucid fatuities of sentimentalism. (See pages 306-307).

Remorse is absolutely central to Gaita’s whole book because it focuses in on the individual—both the individual who does the harm and the individual who has been harmed.  Remorse generates moral understanding through the lens of the individual experience of having done harm and now feeling remorseful about it.  “Remorse teaches us what it is to wrong another.  I would put the point more generally like this.  . . . It [remorse] discloses the fundamental determinant of our understanding of what it is to be a human being.  It is fundamental because it radically transforms what conditions it.  What it is to be a friend, what it is to be a husband, what it is to be a lover, what it is to be a respondent to another’s call to seriousness—these are transformed under the shock of what a human being is disclosed to be in serious remorse” (151).

My first reaction to this passage is to summon up a word Gaita never uses: vulnerability.  What makes a human precious, or at least what Gaita terms an “immediately intelligible object of remorse,” is the fact of how vulnerable that human is to being hurt (by what I or another might do).  The “condition” that remorse causes to come dramatically into view is that susceptibility to being hurt.  Humans are fragile creatures—and evil is taking advantage of that fragility, sometime for reasons of gaining certain advantages, and sometimes for the sheer pleasure of harming another.  Remorse is being repulsed by the vision of the hurt one has caused.  That vision brings home the fact of the other’s vulnerability—and, thus (in Gaita’s view), not only a reaction against my having exploited that vulnerability, but also a more general recognition of the “condition” of vulnerability I share with all other humans.  Some essential element (“fundamental” Gaita says) has been “disclosed” through this individual experience of remorse.

“When we ask what makes . . . an obligation a moral obligation–then I think we should seek at least some part of the answer in the kind of elaboration we give when we express most seriously our sense of what it means to wrong someone. Nowhere is that sense more sober than in lucid remorse. ‘My God what have I done. How could I have done it?’ Those are the typical accents of remorse. They do not (I argue) express an emotional reaction to what one has done, but a pained, bewildered–or perhaps, better, incredulous–realisation of the full meaning of what one has done” (xxi). My italics–because I want to return to these issues of “meaning,” “lucidity,” and “seriousness” in subsequent posts. For now, I just need to highlight that remorse entails a “realisation” of 1) what doing wrong to another means and 2) a recognition that I am the one who did this wrong.

Gaita places a huge emphasis on the way that remorse is connected to “haunting.”  “One way of characterising remorse in its difference from some other moral reactions is to say that it is possible only over what has the power to haunt us.  That power is a certain kind of individuality . . . . [It would] be a form of her humanity becoming manifest to him, of his seeing her as ‘another perspective on the world’ (in the sense in which we use that expression to remind ourselves, and others, of the reality of another human being)”.(157).  The concrete example (which explains the use of the pronoun “her”) is of a man who has raped a woman.  Remorse would entail his being “haunted” by that rape—and would entail her now being “manifest to him” as another human being.  Similarly, Gaita returns several times to the idea of a murderer being “haunted” by his victim.  “A murderer’s remorse is as it is because he murdered a human being, but in order for him to understand that, his victim must remain with him in his distinctively human individuality, for that is what it is to be a human being in any sense that makes the murder of a human being an immediately intelligible object of remorse. . . . He is haunted by the particular being that he murdered” (149; 148).

What can we say about this “haunting”?  It is all so Dickensian, conjuring up pictures of Jonas Chuzzlewit in the throes of the maddening aftermath of committing murder.  Are murderers and rapists really haunted by their misdeeds—and, even more to the point, by their victims?  I suspect, in the case of rape at least, that the victim is much more likely to be haunted by the crime than its perpetrator.  Is PTSD triggered by having killed—or by having been wounded or by having been a witness to the killing of one’s comrades? I mean this as an open question. But it is one that has Socratic implications (to be explored in subsequent posts) because Gaita is deeply committed to–and tries to explain as best he can–the Soctratic claim that it is worse to do evil than to suffer evil. Some kind of “haunting” (the exact nature of which I will need to tease out) appears necessary to this notion that the consequences of doing evil are dire.

Maybe worrying about the absence of any haunting in so many case just points to the obvious fact that many fail to achieve moral understanding, they (I) never have the full reality of another human being come home to them.  And, of course, being haunted by the harm one did to one’s spouse is quite different from being haunted by the harm one did to someone deemed (by whatever line of reasoning) an “enemy.”  Remorse—and its concomitant haunting—is all too rare.  To rely on it to combat evil seems a forlorn hope.

Yet.  What can bring home to anyone the realization that doing harm to another is repugnant?  Gaita will spend lots of time thinking about the harm one does to oneself when inflicting harm on others, the Socratic position.  I will get to that.  But for today I want to end with two final considerations.

First, Gaita usefully distinguishes between regret and remorse.  In my own case, I can illustrate this by saying I have no regrets about the end of my first marriage.  In every imaginable way, I think that my not remaining married to my first wife was a good thing for both of us.  I have no regrets at all that we ended up divorced.  But I am full of remorse for the pain I caused her as we made our way toward that divorce.  I don’t know how I could have avoided causing her that pain, but I hate the fact that I did cause it.  Am I haunted by the image of the “me” who inflicted that pain and by the image of the “she” who was its victim?  That seems a fair characterization of the way those memories inhabit me.  Am I more haunted by the harm I did than she is by the memory of the harm done to her?  I sure hope so (but have no way of knowing since I have had no contact with my ex-wife since our divorce.)  Has my remorse increased my “moral understanding” or made me a better person?  I would say that it is hardly in my hands to answer that question.  I certainly would like to think it has influenced how I have behaved in my second marriage.  But I would hardly claim that it transformed me wholesale.  I still have fallen into habitual patterns of relating to my partner that are harmful—and not radically different from ways I interacted with my first wife.  All of which might only be a way of saying that transformation is hard, is rarely (ever?) very radical, and that our tendency toward evil (toward a failure to imagine the other as a full-bore human being) is always there and always very difficult to overcome. Transformation, especially imagined as located in one epiphanic moment, an eclat, seems to me more the stuff of theater (with those Aristotelian moments of recognition and/or reversal) than of how most lives unfold. Remorse is more endemic (at least in my experience) than marking some clear boundary before and after its arrival.

Second, I want to think briefly about hatred.  Gaita (inspired particularly by Iris Murdoch and Simone Weil, both of whom he invokes many times) wants to activate what he calls “the language of love” (119) as a much more adequate way to think about a “moral understanding” of our desirable relationship to others than the vocabularies offered by the various extant moral philosophies (Kant, Bentham, and Aristotle for short).  That’s why Gaita gravitates toward Socrates (along with Weil and Murdoch), because Plato places such a strong emphasis on love (in the Symposium obviously, but in other places as well). 

What to say then about hatred?  Gaita basically doesn’t mention it.  Evil for him is blindness to the other’s humanity.  But what about an active, hate-generated, desire to harm the other?  A desire that might, in fact, revel in the fact of the other’s humanity, since it is precisely the fact of that humanity that makes one’s intended victim so susceptible to harm.  I am thinking of torture here in all its possible manifestations.  It makes little sense to torture an animal because we don’t have as extensive a sense of the kinds of suffering an animal can experience.  (This might very well be a mistaken understanding of the range of animal sensations, but it remains the case—I would argue—that you cannot torture an animal by describing in full detail ahead of time what physical suffering you intend to inflict on him.)

Hatred would seem to rule out remorse, not because you deny to the one you hate full humanity, but because you believe him to be a depraved example of humanity.  I have been led to think about hatred because I have been reading James Baldwin, specifically his earliest collection of essays, “Notes of a Native Son.”  In that collection (all essays written between the ages of 24 and 31), Baldwin openly states that he hates white people and that he hates his stepfather.  In fact, Baldwin says, having been turned by racism into a hater is one of the worst things racism did to him.  “Hatred, which could destroy so much, never failed to destroy the man who hated and this was an immutable law” (Notes of a Native Son, 84, Library of America edition of Baldwin’s essays).  Baldwin desires to purge himself of hatred (and in later writings after this volume will move to talking a lot about love), but not because of any concern for those he hates—only because of what hatred does to him. 

It seems to me, however, that hatred is much easier to explain than evil; hatred is not “mysterious” the way evil can seem to be.  Hatred, I would suggest, has three prerequisites: 1) an ongoing injury or harm, 2) lacking the power to either end or otherwise escape that harm being done to one, and, finally, 3) an ability to identify a specific person or persons who is inflicting the harm. (Yes, you can hate someone who has harmed you in the past but no longer has the ability to harm you. But it seems to me that hatred in such a case is unlikely to lead to action. The harmed one has managed to escape the infliction of harm and, thus, can let it go. But I am perhaps very much underestimating the strength of the desire for–and the pleasures of–enacting revenge.)

Despair rather than hatred might best describe the case where the first two requirements are met—i.e. a continuing harm one is powerless to alleviate—but where identifying the perpetrator seems impossible.  (I take it this is the case for many of the economically exploited.  Who concretely and specifically to blame for having a dead end job that doesn’t pay enough to afford the rent?  Who to focus one’s hatred on?) 

When there is a focus for the hatred, then inflicting harm can be a pleasure positively to be desired—even if the infliction of harm has little to no chance of alleviating the conditions that generated the hatred.  Hence the actions of the suicide bomber or the sadism of ethno-nationalism.  The desire to lash out is strong—and can prove to dominate over other desires. 

I do think Gaita’s book suffers from neglecting this “positive” incentive (or driver) toward inflicting harm on others.  His thinking is dominated by the “negative” driver, by the lack of an imagination capacious enough to recognize the full humanity of the other.  But that lack is often willful—or, even more disturbing, not lacking at all.  Instead there is a hatred of that other and a fully deliberate decision to take advantage of the other’s sharing the human condition of vulnerability.

Evil

I have finally (after more than three months) finished reading Raimond Gaita’s Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception (Routledge, 2nd. Edition 2004).  It is a dense, brilliant, and in many ways, wise book.  It was very much worth reading it slowly—not just because of the intricacy of many of its arguments, but also to give myself time to ponder their implications before hurrying on.  The book is, in many ways, a mess; Gaita chases any number of hares and their relevance to his central concerns are often tenuous at best.  Plus he is full of prejudices—some of which lead him into taking positions that are egregiously wrong and are simply asserted, not argued for.  In addition, he likes to argue against positions others are claimed to have taken without even naming who these mistaken souls are, and having his representation of their views stand as accurate since they don’t get to speak for themselves. 

All these flaws are readily forgiven because there is something to stir reflection on just about every page.  And now that evil (after the Hamas assault and Israel’s response) is being pondered as it was in the aftermath of 9/11, a book offering its “absolute conception” of that term should be welcome. 

On one reading, Gaita’s absolute conception is awfully thin.  His starting point (at least as I see it) is to accept the Kantian prescription that there is a non-negotiable obligation to respect the other; that human beings are only to be treated as ends in themselves, never as means to some other end.  What Gaita adds is that this obligation is “absolute”—and that philosophers are badly mistaken when they think they can argue their way to making that obligation rational, or binding, or some such substitute for its simply being obligatory. 

He presents this first assertion by way of an argument against Kant.  Basically, he says it is a travesty of the sort to which only a philosopher could subscribe to think our obligation to help a suffering human being is based on a rationally arrived at conclusion that I could not will that everyone neglect that suffering person (i.e. Kant’s categorical imperative).  The direction of obligation runs in exactly the opposite direction.  The appeal to me to help that person is direct; it does not go through the detour of a rational calculation (of either a Kantian or a utilitarian—or even a virtue ethics—kind.)  I don’t think of what the consequences of my helping will be, or what I owe myself as a rational being, or what action would reinforce my virtuous character.  I am called to simply respond to the need of another.  That call is absolute.  Nothing more to be said.

Except of course there are 300 plus pages of more to be said.  But let me first offer some of the ways Gaita strives to express this “absolute” notion of good and evil.  This vision of “goodness” is grounded on “the inalienable preciousness or the infinite preciousness of every human being” (xv).  “Sometimes I speak of seeing the full humanity of someone” (xv).  Moral probity entails “an understanding of the distinctive kind of limit another human being should be to our will” (xix). “When we say that we are treating someone as a means to our ends, we mean that his reality as a human being does not limit our will as it should. Or, to put it more accurately,: it is part of our sense of the reality of another human being, that he be the kind of limit to our will that we express when we say that he must never be treated merely as a means to an end but as an end in himself. We express this more simply when we say we must treat him as a human being. To acknowledge the reality of another human being is to have our will engaged and limited” (278). Gaita is fond of recalling Iris Murdoch’s understanding of the “ethical task” as “seeing the world as it is,” with the primary requirement of “coming to see the reality of another person” (211), which means seeing that person as a “human being” with claims upon us. But an adequate undertaking of that task is not a matter of correct knowledge or correct principles or of following a rational procedure of either observation or decision-making. Rather, it “depends on what we attend to and on the quality of our attention” (269); such qualitative attention is best characterized as “love,” and best understood as “not prompted by love as an investigation might be prompted by curiosity, but . . . [as] itself an expression of love” (211). Goodness is a way of being in the world, a stance of careful (in every sense of the word) attention to all that occupies the world apart from one’s own self, especially attentive care of other humans.

Evil, then, is the failure to acknowledge, and actions that follow upon that failure, the preciousness of the other. A failure to attend to and to care for the other. “Because evil, as I understand it, requires a conception of preciousness violated, and because people can do evil for banal reasons, the concept of evil (that I develop) has little or no place in the characterization of people or their motives.  For that reason, people who say that the concept of evil does not help explain the actions of evildoers are right.  Sometime, however, appeal to the concept is necessary to characterize adequately people’s responses—the person whose remorse is informed by a sense of his victim was infinitely precious, or a spectator who responds to wrongdoing in a way informed by that same sense” (xxvi).

We might conclude from this statement that Gaita’s whole project is hopelessly abstract since it will not offer any help in solving the “mystery” of evil (i.e. how it is that people can do evil things). But what Gaita does think long and hard about is how people might be brought to “an understanding” of how others are precious or should be a limit on their own will. He calls that realization “moral understanding” and is especially good on how such understanding does not coincide with what most philosophers would understand as “knowledge” or as “justified belief.” 

Thus, he wants to reject both sides of the cognitivist/non-cognitivist argument in meta-ethics.  To understand the preciousness of other human beings is not like knowing that water is H2O because moral understanding is not definitive or conclusive; it doesn’t end an inquiry but in fact opens one up.  How am I to act on that understanding in the almost infinite varieties of my encounters with other people?  And the way I do act on that understanding is constitutive of my own character, my own way of living a life.  The understanding, and how I act on it, is therefore individuating.  I have not gained some general truth in reaching that understanding; I have instead been given the puzzle of how to instantiate the understanding. The ethical “task is one that cannot be completed in the sense of issuing in results that could count of the realisation if its end(s) (291). There is no recipe or formula that answers the relevant questions and gives me a blueprint for how to proceed. I can’t ever “know” all there is to know about how to act ethically. How to live a good life, one that eschews evil, means taking into account at every turn the obligation I have toward treating others as precious. What that means in different circumstances is something I need to discover in the specific instance. And there are other considerations besides avoiding evil that influence my choices about how to live—just as there are different circumstances that offer widely various options for actions that are “good.” 

In short, Gaita is arguing that “true” means different things within different discourses or different “conceptual spaces” (a term he likes).  His point is derived from Wittgenstein.  The cognitive/noncognitive choice is forced upon us by a too rigid positivism; that false choice derives from an overly constrictive account of what counts as “true” or “real.”  Either we must join the cognitivist and say that the statement “murder is bad” is “true” exactly in the same was that 2 +2 = 4 is true—or we are trapped into saying that “murder is bad” is not cognitive because it cannot meet that positivist standard of “true.”  Appeals to “ordinary language” do no good here; either they are used to say moral assertions come with a claim to truth and thus underwrite “moral realism,”, or to say that people making moral assertions are just in “error” and need philosophers to show them that their truth claims are unjustified. Gaita is surely right (in my humble opinion) to say we should avoid this whole unproductive and wrongly framed debate.  The whole empirical tradition from Hume through to Dewey that aspired to articulate moral truths that would be as non-contestable as mathematical ones simply failed to see that the standards of truth internal to the edifice of mathematics could not be transferred wholesale over to the standards of truth for moral statements.  The canons of persuasiveness, evidence, argumentation etc. are very different in the two discursive domains. 

Of course, Gaita’s “absolute” conception of good and evil means he can look very much like a non-rationalist.  That is, he does seem at time to be saying that the preciousness of each human being is not something open to argumentation, to refutation by way of rational or philosophical argument. His final chapter offers a very unconvincing (to me) claim that the moral skeptic cannot be “serious”–and therefore should not be argued with. To argue with the skeptic is to already cede the terms of debate to him. Instead, the “absolute” position of an a-rational or pre-rational preciousness of every human being must hold the floor since no one (Gaita implausibly states) really denies that position. (I will have more to say about this stance in subsequent posts, partly because it returns us, I think, to the “mystery” of evil.)

Oddly in light of this grounding claim about the preciousness of the human being, Gaita insists that his argument is non-foundational.  “[My] book is marked, on the one hand, by its strong opposition of fondationalism and, on the other, by its equally strong commitment to a version of the Socratic claim that an unexamined life—a life that does not rise to the requirement to be lucid about its meaning(s)—is unworthy of a human being”(xxii).  What he means is that “my affirmation [of preciousness] is as firm and unreserved as it is metaphysically groundless” (xxvii).  There is no philosophical demonstration available to prove that each of us is precious—just as there are no conclusive arguments to show that one fails to live a “worthy” human life is one is not “lucid” (a favorite Gaita word) about what one is doing with that life. And there is no ontological claim about the status of human beings apart from how human beings regard (and attend to ) one another. Gaita calls his position “non-reductive humanism” (xxiv); that is, the assertion of human preciousness does not “reduce” to something else.  It is absolute in and of itself; self-standing, not resting upon something underneath or more fundamental than itself.  Morality, he is claiming, can only rest on this absolute; attempts to ground morality on other bases—reason, consequences, notions of virtue or of flourishing, or some metaphysical reality—obscure what is actually (and awfully, in the fullest sense of that word) at stake: our treating others and ourselves in a way that attends (in the deepest and fullest possible way) to our humanness, which is given to us absolutely (no rationale for why one exists instead of not existing, and no rationale for what humans are capable to doing with that existence they have been given.)

One last point and I am going to leave it for today.  The result of all this can seem like Gaita spends much of his book hectoring us (in the fashion of his hero Socrates) for not living up to the full possibilities our humanity affords us.  It is true that it would hard to read this book without feeling that one has failed to live up to snuff.  The other side of that coin, however, is that Gaita has an inspiring view of what a life worthy of being human could (should) look like.  Much of the book plays out this vision of what can seem like super-human virtue.  Far better, it seems to me, to take it as inspiring than to respond defensively to its portrait of one’s shortcomings.  I will try to take that approach in future posts on the book—even as I am afraid that I will also be arguing at points that he asks more of humans than they are capable of delivering.  And following that second line will bring Hamas and Israel back into focus.

Non-Cognitive Theories of Art (2): Sensibility Formation

A quick follow-up to the last post.  Nussbaum’s project is to show how the reason/feeling divide misrepresents how we actually come to know things.  Judgments are guided by feelings.  There is no way to separate out feelings when we come to “cognize.”  Rather, feelings are an indispensable component in our acts of knowing.

Still: kindness, grievance, tolerance, sympathy, envy, hatred, and the like are not themselves “knowledge.”  They are better characterized as “dispositions,” as feeling states that influence how we judge situations, people, ourselves, and events.  Because different people have different sensibilities, different sensitivities, they process the world differently.  They come to different conclusions, different judgments, not only abut the significance of what they deem to be the case, but make different assertions about what is the case.

That different dispositions can lead to radically different assertions about the facts of the matter has become very apparent in 2020 America. 

The Trump cult has been created not simply by the man himself but by a right-wing media (led by Fox News) that has inculcated a sensibility best described as combining a perpetual sense of grievance with an openness to believing the worst about designated enemies.  (Immigrants are criminals, Democrats steal elections, liberals are socialists, and leftists are pederasts who are kidnapping massive numbers of children.) 

If cognition is so dependent on disposition, then it is no surprise that one theory of art would say that art is more directed to creating (fostering) certain sensibilities, certain predispositions, in its audience, than in making concrete assertions about what is.  The success of Fox News, or of the “lost cause” narrative in the American South, testify to the power of word, image, story, anecdote, staged emotions (outrage, condemnation, fellow feeling for those on one’s side), ceremony, and ritual to shape how people understand the world and their place in it. 

In our day, “culture” appears more and more intractable.  More than 150 years after the American Civil War, and the set of shared feelings and grievances that ignited that war still shape the American political and social landscape. 

The creation of culture, of shared dispositions across a group of people, is, it can be argued, aesthetic.  It is a matter of shaping feelings, of shaping how we “sense” things, and what “sense” they have for us (to go back to the root meaning of “aesthetic.”)

Thus, one non-cognitive theory of art would look not at any knowledge art might convey, but (instead) to the ways art fosters sensibilities.  If a novel, as Nussbaum claims, makes me more “sympathetic” with the sufferings of orphans, it is not primarily because it has given me new information about orphans.  It is because it has changed my general disposition toward suffering by making me “see” it, experience it, differently—and in a way that moves me beyond just responding to this particular case, this particular orphan, to a more general care for suffering orphans in the plural. 

I want to say more about “sensibility” and what that term might mean in subsequent posts.  And that discussion would connect up with Nick Gaskill’s interest in “aesthetic education” (a concern he shares with Joseph North).  Is the goal of aesthetic education to create certain kinds of sensibilities—and how might that creation be achieved?  I am inclined to think (as a teaser for where I think I am heading on this topic) that Kenneth Burke’s focus on “attitudes” will prove useful here.

But, first, I want to return to the effort to overcome (or, at least, mitigate the fact/value divide)—and that will be the subject of my next post.

Non-Cognitive Theories of Art (1)

Non-Cognitive Theories of Art

Enough of this election anxiety.  Back to the airy heights of theories of the aesthetic.

My four posts on cognitive theories of the aesthetic were really just a prelude to considering non-cognitive theories.  And I am going to start with Martha Nussbaum (although she can be seen as just the latest in a long line that would include David Hume and George Eliot).

Basically, Nussbaum believes that art works activate sympathy.  A novel can portray the sufferings of Oliver Twist and children like him.  Such a novel may serve to bring to our attention facts about orphans and workhouses, thus adding to our knowledge.  But more crucial is the way the story inspires fellow-feeling, a new sympathy for the plight of orphans.  It is one thing to know that orphans are often underfed; it is another thing to respond to that fact feelingly, to experience it as something that should be rectified.  The moral emotions of indignation and sympathy are brought into play through the power of the story, a power that a simple recitation of the facts does not have.

Such a way of explaining what is going on rests on a fairly stark fact/value divide, Hume’s worry about deriving an “ought” from an “is.”  One can see that an orphan does not have enough to eat.  But that seeing does not entail the judgment that the orphan’s hunger is “wrong” (or “unjust”) and that it should be rectified.  Rationalist theories of moral value (Kant or Mill, one deontological, the other utilitarian) believe that reason provides the basis for moral judgments.  But the Humean school hands that job over to feelings.  Our moral judgments come from those moral emotions, from our indignation at suffering felt (perceived?) as unnecessary or cruelly inflicted, from our sympathy with those who suffer.  

Some may be able to see the hungry child and feel no sympathy, may even be able to claim the child is getting what he deserves.  Those seeking to convert such a person to their sympathetic view needs to find a way to pull on the heartstrings, to call forth the needful feelings.  Arguments and reasons will not do the trick.  We don’t know something is heinous simply by looking at it.  Thus it is unlike knowing something is red.  We don’t need some particular “feeling state” to judge the thing is red.  But we do need the appropriate feelings to judge something is unjust, should be condemned and, if possible, rectified.

This is philosophy, so of course it gets complicated.  My own theoretical and moral commitments mean that I really would like to avoid such a sharp fact/value divide.  There are, as far as I can see, two pathways to lessening the gap between fact and value.  Neither, I think, closes that gap completely.

The first path is one I think Nussbaum takes.  She is very committed to the assertion that feeling and cognition are not distinct—that, in fact, a feeling-less cognition is monstrous and mostly impossible.  For her, sympathy enhances understanding.  The story of Oliver Twist increases our understanding of the plight of orphans. (George Eliot would make this claim as well.) If we define “empathy” as the ability to get a sense of another’s experience, then sympathy is the gateway to empathy.  We know more about others when we are able to sympathize with them—and that ability is feeling-dependent.  No amount of simple or “rational” looking will do the job.  The feelings must be activated for the most adequate knowledge to be accessed. 

Thus, Nussbaum (ultimately) is a cognitivist when it comes to (at least) literature. (What she would have to say about non-literary artistic forms is not clear; she seldom writes of them.)  But there still lingers the difference between explanation and understanding, or determinative and reflective judgment.  To know that the house is red is a determinate judgment (in Kant’s terms).  We don’t claim to “understand” the house; we just state what its color is, and would presumably “reduce” that judgment to the physics of wavelengths and the semantic facts about English if we had to explain to someone the basis for the judgment. 

[A digression: I continue to struggle with the possibility that there is a significant difference between “explanation” and “understanding.” To “understand” the orphan’s plight is not to “explain” it; to understand can mean either I now see that he is hungry or now empathize with, have a sense of, his suffering. To explain his hunger would, presumably, be to trace its causes, what factors have deprived him of enough food, or what physiological processes lead to hunger. Since Dilthey (at least) there has been an effort to see “explanation” as characteristic of the sciences, and “understanding” as characteristic of the humanities. My problem–shared with many others–is not being able to work out a clear distinction between explanation and understanding. Plus there is the problem that making such a clear distinction threatens to create another gap similar to the fact/value divide. Do I really want to see the sciences and the humanities as doing fundamentally different things, with fundamentally different goals and methods? How drastic a dualism do I want to embrace–even when a thorough going collapse of all distinctions between the science and humanities is also unattractive? The trouble with many aesthetic theories, in my eyes, is their desperate commitment to finding something that renders the aesthetic distinct from every other human practice and endeavor. I don’t think the aesthetic is so completely distinctive–and I don’t see what’s gained (in any case) if one could prove it unique. So my struggle in this long series of posts on the aesthetic is to find some characteristics of the aesthetic that do seem to hold over a fairly large set of aesthetic objects and practices–while at the same time considering how those characteristics also operate in other domains of practice, domains that we wouldn’t (in ordinary language as well as for analytical reasons) deem aesthetic. And, to name once again the golden fleece I am chasing, I think some account of meaning-creating and meaning-conferring practices is the best bet to provide the theory I am questing for.]

To return to the matter at hand: The judgment that the plight of orphans is unjust or outrageous is a reflective judgment in Kant’s sense.  Reflective judgments have two features that distinguish them from determinative judgments:

1. The category to which this instance is being assigned is itself not fixed.  Thus, for Kant, “beauty” is not a stable standard.  A new work of art comes along and is beautiful in a way we have never experienced before and/or had hardly expected.  But we judge that the term “beauty” is appropriate in this case, even though it is novel—and even though our judgment revises our previous senses of the category “beauty.” 

2. Kant is also very clear that reflective judgments originate in subjective feelings.  He is concerned, of course, to find a way to move from that subjectivism to “universal validity” and “universal communicability.”  But the starting point is individual feeling in a way that it is not for determinative judgments.  My feeling about the house plays no role in my assertion that is red.  But my feelings about the Matisse painting are necessary, although not necessarily sufficient, to my judging it “beautiful.” (not necessarily sufficient because my judgment also takes the sensus communis into account. I judge, as Arendt puts it, in the company of others. Reflective judgment is neither entirely personal nor entirely social. Its public character comes from the fact that it will be stated for/to others.)

Thus, even if we (as Nussbaum wants to do) say our aesthetic and moral judgments count as knowledge, as assertions that we make with confidence and expect others to understand (at least) and agree with (at best), those judgments still arise from a different basis than judgments of fact. (N.B.: I am following Arendt here in taking Kant’s aesthetics as a more plausible basis for morality than Kant’s own moral theory.)

To summarize: aesthetic judgments (“this is beautiful”) and moral judgments (“this is unjust”) would still be seen as “cognitive.”  Such judgments are assertions about how some thing in the world (an art work, an orphan’s hunger) should be understood, should be labeled—and purport to say something substantial about that thing in the world.  But the process by which that judgment is reached—and the process by which I would get others to assent to it—is distinct (in certain ways) from the processes that underwrite statements of fact. A key feature of that difference is the role feelings play in reaching the two different kinds of judgment.

So maybe Nussbaum’s approach is not non-cognitive; instead, it is committed to their being different forms/processes of cognition.  Then we would just get into a fight over what we are willing to label “cognitive.”  How capacious are we willing to let that term be? Is calling the Matisse painting “beautiful” a knowledge claim or not. The positivists, of course, pronounced aesthetic and moral judgments non-cognitive in the 1930s–and philosophers (of whom Nussbaum is prominently one) have been pushing against that banishment ever since. The only stake (it seems to me) would be whether being deemed “cognitive” is also seen as conferring some kind of advantage over things deemed “non-cognitive.”  Nussbaum certainly seems to think so. She is very committed to expanding the realm of the cognitive and the rational to include feeling-dependent judgments—and seems to believe that enhancing the status of such feeling-dependent judgments will increase the respect and credence they command.

But the alternative would be to say credence does not rest on something being cognitive; that we should look elsewhere for what leads people to make judgments and to assent to the judgments that others make. Standard understandings of cognition are just too simple, too restrictive, to account for the complexities of how people actually judge and come to have beliefs. Better to abandon the cognitive/non-cognitive distinction altogether–and provide an alternative story about how we come to think and feel about things.

I am going to leave it here for today—and discuss in my next post an alternative way to lessen the fact/value gap, one that does move toward ignoring characterizing judgments and beliefs as either cognitive or non-cognitive.