Category: Politics

Power, Self-Respect, and Remorse

I have been finding it very hard lately to read any novels from start to finish.  I begin five novels for every one that I actually complete.  Most things I pick up to read strike me as thin in any number of ways: in character development, in linguistic texture, or just jejune in their portrayal of human motives and emotions.  I can recommend The Known World by Edward Jones, a book I think is an absolute masterpiece. Jones imagines a whole world out of whole cloth, and presents it in an intricate tapestry of fragmented events spread over five or six years time.  The writing is spare, but that heightens its impact.  He has a terrible story to tell, but the artistic mastery is exhilarating.  Especially when there are so many bad novels out there.

I just finished reading The Noise of Time, a 2016 novel by Julian Barnes.  It is a fictional retelling of the life and career of Russian composer Dmitri Shostakovich.  I have, in the past, found Barnes’ work fey at times, but I do get to the end of his novels (of which I have read maybe three or four.)  I picked up this one at the public library out of despair, needing to find something, anything, that I would actually read to the end.

What a pleasant surprise then to find it one of the best things I have read in ages.  The basic conceit of the novel centers around the compromises Shostakovich has to make to stay alive in the murderous world of Stalin and then Khrushchev’s Soviet Union.  The novel is a meditation on Power (always capitalized in the novel) and the demands it makes upon those over whom it holds dominion.  In some sense, it is pure Hegelian master/slave.  Power can—and will—kill you.  So what will you do to stay alive?  And if you do manage to do what’s necessary to stay alive, Power will have shredded any and all threads of self-respect.  You will have groveled, lied, betrayed others as well as yourself, and have proved to yourself and all observers your abject cowardice.  Even all that self-abasement may not be enough.  Power is fickle and may choose to execute you anyway at any moment when it no longer deems you useful to its ends—or when its paranoia sends it on one of its periodic killing sprees.

The idea that Power craves dominion, that it feasts upon demonstrating to its underlings their submission, comes through loud and clear in the novel.  And can only make one think of Trump and his need to publicly humiliate his underlings.  The latest example is making RFK Jr. eat McDonald’s burgers. 

One source of Power’s power (so to speak) is its total lack of conscience, its complete inability (refusal?) to feel remorse, its disconnect between self-respect and any assessment of its own deeds.  Maybe this is wrong; maybe Power walks in deluded self-righteousness, truly believing in the evil of its enemies and the beneficence of its own actions.  Power, of course, feeds on the production of enemy lists just as much as it feeds on the abjection of its underlings.  In any case, Barnes’ Shostakovich thinks that conscience and remorse did once hold some sway in human affairs.  Think of Henry IV in the Shakespeare plays, haunted by his crime against his lawful sovereign Richard, whom Henry drove from the throne and then killed.  But, Shostakovich thinks, such is no longer the case.

“He had judged [Shakespeare] sentimental because his tyrants suffered guilt, bad dreams, remorse.  Now that he had seen more of life, and been defeated by the noise of time, he thought it likely that Shakespeare had been right, had been truthful: but only for his own times.  In the world’s younger days, when magic and religion held sway, it was plausible that monsters might have consciences.  Not anymore.  The world had moved on, become more scientific, more practical, less under the sway of old superstitions.  And tyrants had moved on as well.  Perhaps conscience no longer had an evolutionary function, and so had been bred out.  Penetrate beneath the modern tyrant’s skin, go down layer after layer, and you will find that the texture does not change, that granite encloses yet more granite; and there is no cave of conscience to be found” (178-79).

I don’t credit the analysis; there is no evidence at all that a religious world is more moral than an irreligious one.  The barbarities of past history should put that notion to rest.  But that leaves us with the mystery.  The victim of crime is more haunted, more susceptible to self-questioning and self-collapse, than the perpetrator.  The raped is undone; not so much the rapist.  The total lack of conscience, of any portion of self-respect being tied to acting in good faith or with generosity or with kindness, comes to seem a source of power’s power, not a defect from which it will suffer.  As Edmund in King Lear puts it, the very credulousness of the good, along with their desire to actually be good, makes them easier targets for the fully and cheerfully unscrupulous.  There are no limits tyranny will not transgress.

That still leaves us the question of why others go along.  Fear of death, certainly, in the most extreme instance.  And once tyranny is established, fear of other less dire consequences for resisting: prison, loss of livelihood, loss of wealth.  Ducking one’s head and trying to live out of power’s notice will be the strategy adopted by many.  But why enable power to gain its seat in the first place?  Why the cult of the strong, even abusive, leader? 

When I was still teaching, I would ask my students how many of them had experienced a sports coach yelling at them.  Now that girls are almost as likely to have participated in sports as boys, it was usually 75% of my students who had had that experience.  And, almost to a person, they would defend the coach’s yelling, even his (or her; although it was much less frequently a her) humiliating a particular person in front of the whole group.  The coach’s actions showed he cared, they’d say—and then claim the yelling did produce better play from the team.  So, I would then ask, you want me to yell at you, to show I care, and as a good way to get better results from you?  No, they didn’t want teachers who yelled or humiliated students as part of their pedagogy.  But they were hard put to explain why such behavior was OK for the sports coach, but not for the teacher.  Or why they hated the few teachers who had deployed such tactics while admiring the coaches who did similar things.

Barnes considers the admiration for tyrants by having Shostakovich think not of sports coaches, but of orchestra conductors, especially the notorious, but much lauded, Toscanini.

“Such conductors screamed and cursed at orchestras, made scenes, threatened to sack the principal clarinet for coming in late.  And the orchestra, compelled to put up with it, responded by telling stories behind the conductor’s back—stories that made him out to be a ‘real character.’  Then they came to believe what this emperor of the baton himself believed: that they were only playing well because they were being whipped.  They huddled together in a masochistic herd, occasionally dropping an ironic remark to one another, but essentially admiring their leader for his nobility and idealism, his sense of purpose, his ability to see more widely than those who just scraped and blew behind their desks. The maestro, harsh though he might of necessity be from time to time, was a great leader who must be followed. Now, who would still deny that an orchestra was a microcosm of society?” (87).

Irony, the novel makes abundantly clear, is pitifully inadequate response to tyranny.  Yes, while trying to keep your head low, you will try to salvage some self-respect by only offering your assent ironically.  You always reserve to yourself the knowledge that you see through them, and don’t assent in the deepest recesses of your soul.  But not only is irony totally ineffective, accomplishing nothing, but you can only trick yourself for so long if you are one of the unfortunates who truly values self-respect.  It won’t take much to recognize how cheap irony is, how pathetic a dodge. 

“And irony has its limits.  For instance, you could not be an ironic torturer; or an ironic victim of torture.  Equally, you could not join the Party ironically.  You could join the Party honestly, or you could join it cynically; those were the only two possibilities.  And to an outsider, it might not matter which was the case, because both might seem contemptible.  . . . If you turned your back on irony, it curdled into sarcasm.  And what good was it then?  Sarcasm was irony that had lost its soul” (190-91).

John Quiggan, the Australian economist and blogger, tells us Trump will be a dictator. (Find his short post here: https://crookedtimber.org/2024/11/19/trumps-dictatorship-is-a-fait-accompli/#comments)

Right now, in the brief interlude before Trump takes office, the Americans I talk to are fearful, but don’t really believe that full-blown tyranny is our future.  We might very well be sleep walking; Quiggan may be right.  And then we will have to learn the awful expedients to which one resorts to in order to live under tyranny—and learn just how much self-respect each of us is willing to sacrifice to insure survival.

Capitalism, Climate Change, and Affordable Housing

William Davies has a thought-provoking review of The Price is Wrong: Why Capitalism Won’t Save the Planet by Brett Christophers (Verso, 2024) in the latest London Review of Books (https://www.lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v46/n07/william-davies/antimarket).

The basic point of the review (and, presumably, of Christophers’ book) is that the imperatives of capitalist profit are a major impediment to making any progress in moving away from fossil fuels to renewable sources of energy.  The specifics of the argument are simple and compelling, but have far-ranging implications.  Basically, fossil fuel extraction generates a profit rate of approximately 15% a year for the oil companies.  Yes, there are the original investment costs of exploration and setting up the drilling sites, plus refining processes, but the resultant gasoline can then be sold at a premium price.  Renewables also require a large initial investment—but they don’t yield a product that can be brought to market except within the confines of heavily regulated utility markets.  On average, solar and wind generate a profit rate of 8%.  Davies quotes Wael Sawan, the CEO of Shell: “Our shareholders deserve to see us going after strong returns. If we cannot achieve the double-digit returns in a business, we need to question very hard whether we should continue in that business. Absolutely we want to go for lower and lower and lower carbon, but is has to be profitable.” The bottom line uber alles; investors will not move their money from oil to solar because the rate of return is not sufficient enough.

This economic logic means that capitalists basically insist that they will act only if subsidized (bribed) by the state.  There are really only three alternatives here—and states have been very reluctant to use two of the three.  1) States could introduce strong tax or other policies that would drive down the profit rates enjoyed by oil companies.  States have basically refused to take this approach because of the fear that heavily taxed (or otherwise thwarted) companies will just move their operations to friendlier venues.  Capital is mobile, states are not. 

2) De-risking.  States can assume the risk of capital investment, while leaving the profits in private hands.  This kind of backstopping of financial risk is, of course, rife in the financial markets.  The response to 2008 was a classic case of the state assuming the burden of the losses generated by financial overreach, even as bankers and brokers happily pocketed their somewhat smaller bonuses.  For all its cowboy talk of risk, capitalists love nothing more than a sure thing—and will blackmail the state into providing that surety any chance they get.  But de-risking is not relevant to the switch from oil to renewables.  It’s not the risk that is preventing that switch; it is the smaller profit rate.

So that leaves #3) state subsidies.  We see that with Biden’s so-called industrial policy.  The state will make the up-front investments needed—and then private enterprises will get to pocket the profits. (Something similar happens with government funding of the R&D needed to develop new drugs.) If the state builds the infrastructure for renewables, then the profits for the companies that then come in to manage them will go up.

The whole thing is supposed to work via carrot not stick.  Make investing in solar profitable enough and capital will move in that direction.  Rely on the magic of market incentives.  Except that there is more than enough capital sloshing around out there in search of safe returns that even as solar and wind get developed, fossil fuel extraction is not being slowed down.  Money is not moving out of oil toward renewables, especially when it is the state, not capital markets, that are supplying the funds to build the renewables.  Without a strong intervention into the way capitalist markets and incentives work, the production and use of fossil fuels will continue apace. As long that is, if there is money to be made in fossil fuels, capitalists will do the work to make it.

What does this have to do with affordable housing?  I read Matthew Yglesias and Noah Smith pretty faithfully—and anyone familiar with them and their ilk know that creating “abundant” housing (as well as abundant energy) is one of their major passions.  The basic argument is that market-based solutions are the only way to reach the goal of enough—and affordable—housing.  Here’s a link to a recent Noah Smith blog post that will give you the flavor of the kinds of arguments he and Yglesias regularly make. (https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/#inbox/FMfcgzGxSbrtnkhNWfpnKDTnSWnzFsvh  The relevant section is number three in this list of five “interesting things.”)  Developers won’t build housing at all if they don’t stand to make a “reasonable” profit.  So, this particular piece argues, if you make them build “affordable units,” they just won’t build at all (unless, of course, there is a public subsidy that acts to push their profit margin back up.) 

In short, you have to bribe developers to build affordable housing—and, even then, the percentage of affordable units in any new development will be fairly small.  My hometown of Chapel Hill offers a case in point.  The town passed a ten million dollar bond to increase affordable housing.  Some of that money went to rent subsidies, but a large amount of it went to developers—and new apartment buildings and complexes are going up all over town.  At most, these new developments include 15% affordable units; in most cases, the percentage of affordable units is well below that.  The average for all the projects appears to hover around 12%.

In other words, to get access to the lucrative Chapel Hill market, developers must agree to provide some affordable units—and they get a monetary bribe to do so on top of permission to build.  Even worse, the town reports that only 10% of these new units are “permanently affordable.”  That is, after the originally tenants move out, rents can revert to “market rates.” (Source: Town of Chapel Hill web site and its various reports on development approvals and affordable housing.)

It is for exactly this reason that Noah Smith’s blog post argues that mandating the inclusion of affordable units is a losing strategy.  But because he will not countenance any interference in market processes, Smith has only two other strategies to offer. 1) Rent subsidies.  Just having the government help tenants pay their rent.  (Smith, like all economists, insists that rent control does not work.)  2) Let developers build non-affordable (i.e. market rate) housing.  If we build enough, the law of supply and demand will kick in and rents will fall.  It’s simply a question of getting enough supply.  Yes, the new units will go for a premium, but older housing will become cheaper as it becomes less competitive, less desirable.  This insistence that building new housing, no matter how expensive, will eventually drive down costs is an article of absolute faith for Yglesias, Smith, and all the other soi disant YIMBYs.

The problem is: how much is enough?  In Chapel Hill, it’s a Red Queen race. Why?  Because more and more college students have abandoned dorms for off-campus living.  Because die-hard TarHeel fans buy condos to stay in when coming to football and basketball games.  Because the town is very, very desirable for retirees and for those with school-age children (best school district in the state) and for its general laid-back, liberal, college town vibe.  It will always be a game of catch-up in Chapel Hill.  The demand will always outstrip the supply.  And it’s an upscale market, so the cost is always going to reflect that the town is an enclave for the comfortably off. 

The market signals and the market processes are very clear in the Chapel Hill case: build it and they will come—and they will pay a premium price to be here.  Waiting for the market to drive prices down means waiting a very, very long time indeed.  And renders the subsidies the town is paying to developers a token gesture that, effectively, is providing developers with access to this market while doing very little to move the needle on housing affordability.

Where does that leave us?  Rolling up the ladder and just preventing any growth, any new housing development?  That seems unconscionable.  But it does seem like we should recognize that the market rules of the game are rigged.  The developers hold all the good cards.  They can always go elsewhere—to places where the bribes will be bigger, or where there is no demand to include affordable units. (That’s why Smith thinks jurisdictions should just abandon making that demand.) And the town has no capacity to build anything itself. They have no recourse but to placate developers if they want any new housing built at all.

Public housing has not been a success in this country.  Perhaps it has been elsewhere (I don’t know enough on that score.)  But giving up on state-built and state-managed housing doesn’t necessarily mean we have to fall back on the market as currently configured, that we just have to resign ourselves to giving into all the developers’ demands .  Public utility companies work pretty well, as do public hospitals.  We have instituted profit limits for medical insurance and regulate other forms of insurance as well.  The YIMBYs say housing—and especially zoning—regulations stand in the way of our achieving housing abundance.  But do we really want to leave provision of a basic need to the market?  We, as a society, intervene in all kinds of ways in the production and pricing and quality of food. Our food policies are, admittedly, a mess. But would we really want unregulated food production and distribution, to return to the adulterated products of nineteenth-century laissez-faire?

It is no surprise that developers in Chapel Hill are currently playing the cards that are dealt them.  They are gaming the system that currently exists.  No doubt they would work to game any other system of regulations that were put in place.  But that’s no reason for the community and its local government to fold, to just throw up its hands and say “let the market have its way; it’s too strong for us.” 

Smith blog post concludes: there are only two effective strategies.  Let builders build and provide rent subsidies.  Trying to build affordable housing just doesn’t work, in his view.  What he does not consider (if we accept that publicly built and administered housing is off the table) is developing a housing policy that regulates the market in ways designed to get the results everyone claims to want: enough and affordable housing for everyone. 

In Chapel Hill’s case, such a policy would, for starters, have to be state-wide.  As a single jurisdiction, and in competition with other jurisdictions, Chapel Hill doesn’t stand a chance.  It is forced into making terrible deals with developers because of the threat that they won’t build here at all.  And then (very annoying) we have to hear about everything they are doing to address our affordable housing crisis—when in fact they are collecting a bucketful of water in a deluge.  That the hands of local government are tied is a terrible thing—and is leading to terrible outcomes that do next to nothing to solve our problems.  Accusing their opponents of racism hardly covers their own futility. 

We are back where we started.  It is pretty much universally accepted by liberal economists that health care cannot be left to an unregulated market.  But those same liberals seem to have come to the opposite conclusion when it comes to housing.  The prevailing orthodoxy among self-labeled “progressives” is that we need to deregulate, to take away impediments to development, so that abundance may be achieved.  But that position overlooks the relentless—and amoral—search for profits that the market unleashes and rewards.  To expect developers to solve our housing problems is as unrealistic as it is to expect Mobil to solve our climate crisis.

Disparate Economies 4: Power

Warning: this post is even more essayistic than most. A lot of speculation as I drunkenly weave through a variety of topics and musings.

The previous posts on disparate economies have tried to consider how economies of status, love/sex, and fame are structured.  What is the “good” or “goods” that such markets make available, and what are the terms under which those goods are acquired, competed for, and exchanged.  Finally, what power enforces the structures and the norms that keep a market from being an anarchic free-for-all.  Markets (or specific economies among the multiple economies that exist—hence my overall heading “disparate economies”) are institutions, by which I mean they a) have discernible organizational shape, along with legitimated and non-legitimated practices by human agents within them; b) are not the product of any individual actor or even a small cadre of actors but are socially produced over a fairly long span of time; and c) change only through collective action (sometimes explicit as in the case of new laws, but much more often implicitly as practices and norms shift almost imperceptibly through the repetitions of use.)  Institutions exist on a different scale than individual actors—or even collective actors.  A sports team exists within the larger container of the institution that is the sport itself, just as a business corporation exists within the market in which it strives to compete.

It is a well recognized fact that power is among the goods that human compete for.  In one sense, this fact is very odd.  Here is one of Hobbes’ many reflections on power:

The signs by which we know our own power are those actions which proceed from the same; and the signs by which other men know it, are such actions, gesture, countenance and speech, as usually such powers produce: and the acknowledgment of power is called Honour; and to honour a man (inwardly in the mind) is to conceive or acknowledge, that that man hath the odds or excess of power above him that contendeth or compareth himself . . . and according to the signs of honour and dishonour, so we estimate and make the value or Worth of a man. (1969 [1640], 34–35) The Elements of Law: Natural and Politic. Ed. Ferdinand Tönnies. London: Frank Cass and Co.

Hobbes, sensibly it would seem, focuses on what power can “produce.”  For him, power is a means not an end.  Power is capacity.  We know someone is powerful when he is able to produce the ends toward which he aims.  This is power to, the possession of the resources and capabilities required for successful action.  Such power, Hobbes goes on to say, also produces, as a by-product, “honor.”  The powerful man is esteemed by others; in fact, Hobbes states, power is the ultimate measure by which we determine a person’s “value or worth.”  Since, presumably, we want others to esteem us and to think of us as worth something, as having value, it makes sense that we would seek power not only because it yields the satisfaction of accomplishing our aims, but also because it gains us the respect of our peers.

Still, power is instrumental here; it is valuable for what it enables one to get.  There is no sense of power as an end-in-itself.  In that respect, power is like money.  Human perversity is such that something (money or power) which has no intrinsic value of its own, but is only a means toward something else that is of intrinsic value, nonetheless becomes the object of one’s desires.  Power, like money, is stored capacity—and, like money, one can devote oneself to increasing one’s store.  Yes, spending power, like spending money, has its own pleasures, but there is an independent urge, an independent compulsion, to increase one’s holdings.  And that urge can become a dominant, even over-riding, compulsion.

Of course, money and power can be converted into one another. Still, the insanities of current-day American plutocracy illustrate that the conversion is not easy or straight-forward.  Think of the Koch brothers (or any other number of megalomaniac billionaires).  The Kochs think their money should allow them to dictate public policy.  Why, as Gary Will asked many years ago, are these rich people so angry?  Why are they so convinced that their country is in terribly bad shape—when they have done and are doing extremely well?  They don’t lack money, but they believe their will is being thwarted. Their money has been able to buy them power—but not the kind of absolute power they aspire to.  They meet obstacles at every turn, obstacles they can only partially overcome.  And from all appearances, it seems to drive them crazy.  They want to be able to dictate to the nation in the same way they can dictate to their employees.  The thrill of being able to say “you’re fired.” Donald Trump on The Apprentice. Apparently, just the thrill of watching some one else exercise that absolute power is a turn-on for lots of people.

Which reminds us that power is not only capacity, power to, but also domination, power over.  Returning to the issue of “an economy,” in this matter of power, the competition is over the resources necessary to possess power.  On the one hand, power to depends on assembling enough resources (time, money, health, opportunity, freedom) to set one’s own goals and accomplish them.  On the other hand, among the resources one can require, especially for complex enterprises, is the cooperation of others.  One person alone cannot accomplish many of the things humans find worth aiming for.  How to ensure the contributions of others to one’s projects?  Being the person who controls the flow of resources to those people is one solution.  Help me—or you won’t be given the necessities for pursuing your own projects.  Hegel famously reduces this dynamic to its most fundamental terms.  Your project is to live—and unless you do my bidding, you will not be given the means to live.  The calculus of power over, of mastery over another human being, is based on life being valued—and thus serving as the basic unit of exchange—in struggles for mastery.

I have in my previous posts on these different economies attempted to specify the norms (or rules in more formal economies) that structure competition and exchange in each case.  And I have tried to indicate the power(s) that enforce those norms/rules.  Thus in the sex/love market there is an ideal of reciprocity; the partners to an exchange freely and willingly give to each other.  Where that norm is violated (most frequently in male coercion of women) family and/or the state will, in some cases, intervene.  The deck is stacked against women because family and state intervention is imperfect and intermittent.  But there are still some mechanisms of enforcement, even if they are not terribly effective, just as there are recognized ideal norms even if they are frequently violated.  Similarly, the billionaire may have gained his wealth through shady means, but he has still operated in a structured market where violation of the rules can lead to prison (even if it seldom does).  Outright theft, just like rape in the sex/love market, is generally deemed a crime.

How to translate these considerations over into the competition for power? It would seem that slavery is the equivalent of rape and theft—something now universally condemned as beyond the pale.  But it seems significant to me that the condemnation of slavery is not even 200 years old—while slavery as a practice persists.  Of course, rape and theft persist as well.  And I guess we could say that minimum wage laws and various labor protecting regulations/statutes also aim at limiting the kinds of resource withholding that allows one to gain power over another.  So there is some attempt to avoid a Hobbesian war of all against all, with no holds barred.  Still, within any economy that enables—and mostly allows—large inequalities, the ability of some to leverage those avenues to inequality into power over others will go mostly unchecked. 

Where there is no structure and no norms, the result appears to be endless violence.  From Plato on, the insecurity of tyrants has been often noted.  Power might be accumulated as a means to warding off the threat that others will gain the upper hand.  In this free-for-all, no one is to be trusted.  Hence the endless civil wars in ancient Rome and late medieval England (as documented in Shakespeare’s plays among other places), along with the murders of one’s political rivals—and erstwhile allies.  From Stalin’s murderous paranoia to Mafia killings, we have ample evidence that struggles for power/dominance are very, very hard to bring to closure.  Competition simply breeds more competition—and the establishment of some kind of modus vivendi among the contenders that allows them to live is elusive.  Power does seem, at least to the most extreme competitors in this contest, a zero sum game.  If my rival has any power at all, he is a threat. 

In his life of Mark Antony, Plutarch has this to say of Julius Caesar:  “The real motive which drove him to make war upon mankind, just as it had urged Alexander and Cyrus before him, was an insatiable love of power and an insane desire to be the first and greatest man in the world” (Makers of Rome, Penguin Classics, 1965: p. 277.)  There’s a reason we think of men like Caesar—or like some of today’s billionaires—as megalomaniacs.  They harbor an “insane desire” for preeminence over all other humans. If power equals preeminence, then, in their case, it is an end-in-itself.  They desire that all bow before them—which is what power over entails.  There is still the suspicion, however, that power is the means to the “honor” of being deemed “the first and greatest man in the world.”  And there is certainly no doubt in Plutarch’s mind, as there was no doubt in Hegel’s, that killing others is a requirement for gaining such power.  Only a man who “makes war upon mankind” can ascend to that kind of preeminence.

For Nietzsche, of course, the desire for power is primary.  But even in his case, it’s not clear if power is an end or merely a means.  What is insufferable to Nietzsche is submission.  Life is a struggle among beings who each strive to make others submit to them.  It would seem that “autonomy” is the ultimate good in Nietzsche, the ability to be complete master over one’s own fate.  That’s what power means: having utter control over one’s self.  Except . . .  everything is always contradictory in Nietzsche.  At times he doesn’t even believe there is a self to gain mastery over.  And there is his insistence that one must submit completely to powers external to the self; amor fati is the difficult attitude one should strive to cultivate.  We are, he seems to say, ultimately powerless in the face of larger, nonhuman forces, that dwarf us. In short, I don’t think Nietzsche is very helpful in thinking about power.  His descriptions of it and of the things that threaten it are just too contradictory.

Machiavelli is, I think, a better guide.  His work returns us to the issue of security.  When I teach Machiavelli, I always have some students who say he is absolutely right: it’s a dog eat dog world.  Arm yourself against the inevitable aggression of the other or you will be easily and ignominously defeated.  I think this is a very prevalent belief system out there in the world—usually attached to a certain brand of right wing politics.  To ventriloquize this position: It is naïve to expect cooperation or good will from others, especially from others not part of your tribe.  They are out to get you—and you must arm yourself for self-protection (if nothing else).  Your good intentions or behavior is worth nothing because there are bad actors out there.  It is inevitable that you will have to fight to defend what is yours against these predators.  

This right wing attitude often goes hand-in-hand with a deeply felt acknowledgement that war is hell, the most horrible thing known.  But it’s sentimental and weak to think that war can be avoided.  It is necessary—and the clear-eyed, manly thing is to face that necessity squarely.  Trying to sidestep that necessity, to come to accommodations that avoid it (appeasement!) are just liberal self-delusions, the liberal inability to believe in the existence of evil.  Power in this case is the only surety in an insecure world—and even power will still get involved in the tragedy of war, where the costs will be borne by one’s own side as well as by the evil persons one is trying to subdue.  Power cannot fully insulate you from harm. (I think John McCain embodied this view–along with the notions of warrior honor that often accompany it.)

It is a testament to the human desire (need? compulsion?) to structure our economies, our competitions, that there are also “rules” of war.  On the extreme right wing, there is utter contempt for that effort.  There are no rules for a knife fight, as we learn in Butch Cassidy.  It’s silly to attempt to establish rules of war—and crazy to abide by them since it only hands an advantage to your adversary. And certainly it is odd, on the face of things, to try to establish what counts as legitimate killing as contrasted to illegitimate killing when the enterprise is to kill so many people that your adversary can no longer fight against you, no longer having the human resources required to continue the fight. 

I don’t know what to think about this.  Except to say that the specter of completely unstructured competitions scares humans enough that they will attempt to establish rules of engagement even as they are involved in a struggle to the death.  But I guess this fact also makes clear how indispensable, how built in as a fundamental psychological/social fact, morality has become for humans.  On very tricky and speculative grounds here.  But it seems to me that any effort to distinguish between murder and non-murder means that some kind of system of morality is in play.  Murder will be punished, whereas non-murder will be deemed acceptable.  The most basic case, of course, is that soldiers are not deemed guilty of murder.  The killing they do falls into a different category.  What I am saying is that once you take the same basic action—killing someone—and begin to sort it into different categories, you have a moral system.  The rules of war offer one instance of the proliferation of such categories as moral systems get refined; differentiations between degrees of murder, manslaughter, self-defense and the like offer another example of such refinements.  My suspicion (although I don’t have all the evidence that would be required to justify the universal claim I am about to make) is that every society makes some distinction between murder (unsanctioned and punished) and non-murder (cases where killing is seen as justified and, then, non-punishable.)  At its most rudimentary, I suspect that distinction follows in-group and out-of-group lines.  That is, killing outsiders, especially in states of war, is not murder, whereas killing insiders often is.  The idea of a distinction between combatants and non-combatants comes along much later.

Similarly, worrying about “just” versus “unjust” wars also comes much later.  Morality is no slouch when it comes to generating endless complications.

I may seem to have wandered far from the issue of an economy in which the good that is competed for is power.  But not really.  War is the inevitable end game of struggles for power if Hegel is right to say that life is the ultimate stake in the effort to gain mastery over others.  If the economy of power is utterly anarchic, is not structured by any rules, then conquest is its only possible conclusion.  It is the ultimate zero-sum game.  The introduction of rules is an attempt to avoid that harsh zero-sum logic.  Putin out to conquer the Ukraine and Netanyahu out to destroy Hamas are zero-sum logics in action.  As is the Greek practice of killing all the male inhabitants of a conquered city while taking the women off into slavery.  The rules—like negotiated peace deals—try to leave both parties to the conflict some life, to avoid its being a fight to the total destruction of one party. 

The alternative (dare I say “liberal”) model is the attempt to distribute power (understood as the capacity to do things that one has chosen for oneself as worth doing) widely.  This is not just an ideology of individual liberty, of equal worth and its right to self-determination free from the domination of others.  It is also about checks and balances, on the theory that power is only checked by other powers—and that all outsized accumulations of power lead to various abuses.  Various mechanisms (not the least of which is a constitution, but also some version of a “separation of powers”) are put in place to prevent power being gathered into one or into a small number of hands.  The problem, of course, in current day America is that there are not parallel mechanisms to prevent the accumulation of wealth into a few hands—and there are no safeguards against using that wealth to gain power in other domains, including the political one.  That’s why we live in a plutocracy.  Our safeguards against accumulations of power are not capable of effectively counteracting the kinds of accumulation that are taking place in real time.

Recently, on the Crooked Timber blog, Kevin Munger offers this nugget (it appears to be a quote from somewhere, not Munger’s own formulation.  But he does not offer a source for it.)

“There is a great gap between the overthrow of authority and the creation of a substitute. That gap is called liberalism: a period of drift and doubt. We are in it today.”

On this pessimistic reading, power, like nature, abhors a vacuum.  Any situation in which authority/power is dispersed (as it is in the ideal liberal polity) will be experienced as unstable, unsettling, and chaotic.  The desire for order will triumph over the liberties and capacities for self-determination that the “overthrow of authority” enables.  Authoritarianism, the concentration (centralization) of power into a few hands, will rise again. Liberalism is always only a temporary stop-gap between authoritarian regimes. Humans, in this pessimistic scenario, simply prefer the certainties of domination to the fluidity (“drifts and doubts”) generated by less hierarchical social orders.  Just keep your head down and let those insane for power fight it out among themselves, hoping they will mostly leave you alone and let you focus on the struggles of your not-very-capaciously resourced life. 

Unfair as a characterization of a certain form of political quietism that skews rightward?  I don’t know.  But many people are content to not strive terribly hard for riches, power, or fame—and think their moderation of desire is the only sensible way to live.  They just want to be left in peace to make of life what they can with the extremely modest resources available to them.  Here we see yet another great divide in current-day American politics.  (It is hardly the only divide and not, I think, among even the three most important divides between left and right in our time.  But it still exists.) Namely, the idea that it is authoritarian government that will give them the peace they desire, get government off their backs, and curb the chaos of social mores that they feel threatens their children.  Liberal permissiveness, along with the liberal coddling of the unworthy, is the real danger to the country and to their “values”—and a healthy dose of authority is just the remedy we need.