Category: Politics

Detour: Hatred, Fear, and Violence

“What was most difficult was the fact that I was forced to admit something I had always hidden from myself, which the American Negro has had to hide from himself as the price of public progress; that I hated and feared white people.  This did not mean that I loved black people; on the contrary, I despised them, possibly because they failed to produce Rembrandt.  In effect, I hated and feared the world.  And this meant, not only that I thus gave the world an altogether murderous power over me, but also that in such self-destroying limbo I could never hope to write” (James Baldwin, “Autobiographical Notes,” p. 8, Library of America edition of Baldwin’s Collected Essays).

It is notable in Baldwin’s case—and to a large extent in the case of African-Americans more generally—that the stimulus to violence that we assume hatred and fear to provide is turned inward.  Black on black violence is much more prevalent than black on white violence.  Baldwin’s work circles around this fact, even though he approaches it obliquely because violence is only very rarely an explicit topic for him.  His topic, rather, is self-hatred, the warping of soul, the alienation from (or fear of) one’s emotional self, that is the result of self-hatred. 

More usually, we think of the effects of hatred and fear as directed outwards—toward the object of those emotions.  In my short thoughts about hatred two posts back, I think I got it wrong, which is why I want to return to the topic today (detouring for the moment away from Raimond Gaita’s work).

I said that hatred is spurred by impotence in the face of ongoing injury.  We hate the one who is inflicting that injury.  But I was wrong to stress “ongoing.”  It is perfectly ordinary to hate someone for a past injury that is no longer being inflicted.  The politics of grievance and the pleasures of revenge do not depend on current injury.  Another way to say this is that hatred is retrospective—it is always generated by something that has already been done.  (Note that it makes little difference if the injury is a real one or an imagined one.  More accurate perhaps to say that most descriptions of injury done combine fact and fantasy.  Grievance doesn’t do understatement.  Inflation is its more characteristic mode.) The injury may be ongoing, but it also may be over and done with, but not forgotten or forgiven, still a potent source of hate.

I think there are two particularly characteristic forms of grievance (which fosters hate).  The first is a response to injuries done.  The second, however, is closer to what social psychologists characterize as envy, shading into resentment.  This form of hate is directed to those who are deemed to enjoy undeserved benefits (fame, acclaim, respect, money, among other possibilities).  Self-righteous indignation is a keynote of this form of hatred.  The other is accused of any number of sins (hypocrisy almost always on that list since the wool is being pulled over most of the world’s eyes). The worldly success of whatever form the hated one enjoys is based on fraud, on a covering up of his true unworthiness.  Hence the resentment—and the proclivity of this kind of hatred for conspiracy theories.  The truth is being hidden by nefarious means.  Everyone except the hater—and his fellow truth-sayers—is in on the cover-up, on the refusal to see and/or speak the truth.

Envy, resentment, suspicion, hatred.  Plus a sense of grievance.  The world is against me and stubbornly refuses to acknowledge the truth that the hated one enjoys benefits he does not deserve.  In fact, this person who is living high off the hog should be punished for his misdeeds.

It should be obvious that a certain kind of politics can follow from this form of hatred.  And that the alleged injuries this politics claims to address need not be connected to an injury done personally to oneself.  Rather, this politics can present itself as civic-minded, as working to clear society of corruption, of the rot that leads to the wrong people sitting on top of the heap.

As is well documented, ambitious politicians can find appealing to such grievances (and identifying specific targets for those grievances) a good way to build a group of supporters.  It doesn’t matter if the politician is cynically using the fact of grievance or actually himself shares that sense.  Either way, once in power only a punitive approach to the designated unworthies will satisfy his followers and allow him to retain their support.  Grievance politics leads to evil in Gaita’s sense—to treating other human beings in ways that one would never treat oneself.  All in the name of what is “deserved.”

This is why punishment is always queasy making.  It has too deep an entanglement in hatred to not exceed (no matter what the effort to make the punishment “proportionate” to the crime) the attempts to place bounds upon it.  (The legal guardrails I discussed in my first post on Gaita are an attempt to keep the reins on punishment.)  Underneath that apparent rationalism of putting the rapist in prison is the physical abuse that prison entails.  We have never extirpated corporeal punishment from our criminal justice system.  That system, instead, gives license to hatred and violence at certain specific sites within it—even if those sites are usually hidden from view.  The cell phone camera has made police violence on the streets more visible; what goes on in jails and prisons remains almost entirely out of sight.

In sum: hatred focuses on what has already happened, on the status that some people enjoy or the injury some people have done, and it justifies violence.  It can even lend a kind of righteousness to violence, a sense of “righting” wrongs. 

A very common idea these days is that violence is enabled by rendering another human being “other”—putting him in a different category by virtue of his race, his religion, his sexual orientation.  What I am saying is that such “othering” does not (in my view) enable violence unless that other is deemed a reprobate, an offender against some moral code.  Hatred goes hand in hand with moral condemnation.  Not in every case, but more often than not—or such is my suspicion.

This is a way of saying that violence is so terrible, is such a strong taboo, that some notion of self-righteousness is need to lead someone to kill or to torture. 

Hamas does seem motivated by hatred—and by a hatred so pure in its desire to inflict injury on the hated ones that all consequences be damned.   Their attack looks to me like the kind of murder/suicide we get in some of the mass shootings in the US, and even more frequently in domestic violence cases.  There is, it seems to me, no notion that violence could be a solution in Hamas’ case (unlike the delusional notion that violence could actually accomplish something, a notion the US indulged to its and others’ cost both in Vietnam and Iraq).  Hamas is just striking out in fury because it has no better ideas about how to improve things—and has decided instead to just destroy things and take as many of the “enemy” with them as they proceed to doom. 

Is that evil?  Certainly inflicting pain just for the sake of inflicting pain, killing others just for the sake (pleasure?) of killing them, would seem to fit the bill as at one of the forms evil takes. (Here, as elsewhere, human ingenuity and perversity leads to diversity. It would be a mistake to believe evil does not come in myriad forms.)

To pivot to fear.  If hatred is retrospective, fear is anticipatory.  You can’t fear something that has already happened.  You can only fear what is still coming down the pike.  I can fear the consequences (still to come) of what I did, but it makes no sense to say that I now fear what I did yesterday.  Fear of the other can certainly be used to justify violence—the “preemptive strike” doctrine that the George W. Bush administration promulgated. 

Fear can often go hand in hand with a politics of grievance.  That undeserving group is also a threat because of what it will do in the future if left unchecked.  More generally, a politics of fear can be used to declare certain groups in a society outside the bounds of inclusion.  “They” are not to be tolerated, or given a voice in decision-making, or (most dramatically) allowed to assume power because they will destroy the society if given the opportunity.  So fear, like hatred, can be a great “justifier.”  It can offer a reason for violence—in order to preempt the harm (the injury) “those people” will do if given the chance. 

And, of course, hatred/grievance and fear can co-exist–often in ways that reinforce one another.

I don’t think we can reach any easy conclusions about whether a politics of grievance and/or of fear is more characteristic of what we call the “right” as contrasted to the “left.”  Much of that would depend on how willing proponents of either wing are to act violently against those they hate or fear.  I do think it true that politicians of the right over the past 100 years have been more likely to try to ride the wave of grievance than politicians of the left—and much less reluctant to use violence.  But why FDR’s outright demonization of “economic royalists” has mostly disappeared from the rhetoric of left-leaning politicians is a mystery (one that conspiracy theories about leftist politicians having been “bought out” by Wall Street and corporate money claims to explain.)

In sum, what interests me is how people permit themselves to be violent, to treat other human beings as much less than precious (to use Gaita’s understanding of “evil.”)  Hatred and fear, which gravitate toward seeing others as either morally condemnable or as a threat, play a huge role in such justifications of violence.

Treason—and Trump

I have been working my way (painfully slowly) through Raimond Gaita’s Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception (2nd. Edition, Routledge, 2004).  It’s a brilliant, fascinating, frustrating, idiosyncratic book.  Amazingly right in places, confoundingly wrong in others—and all over the map.  I hope to write more directly about its main arguments in subsequent posts.

Right now, however, I just want to use what he has to say (in one of his digressive moments) about treason.  Here’s the most relevant passage (for my purposes here, but also for what seems to me his apt understanding of what treason is):

“Treason is a crime against the conditions of political communality.  Traitors, by ‘aiding and abetting’ the enemy of their people, help those who would destroy them as a people.  Or, they deliver their people and the conditions that make them a people—which enable them to say ‘we’ in ways that are not merely enumerative but expressive of their fellowship in a political identity—as a hostage to the improbable good fortune that their enemies will respect their integrity as a people.  Therefore, treason is not essentially, or indeed ever at its deepest, a crime against the state.  It is actually a crime against a form of civic association” (253-54).

To wit: treason threatens the very terms of, the very existence, of the civic association that undergirds the state.  In reference to Trump: the crime is not against the state, but against the very conditions that make the state possible.  That is, one crucial term of American civic association is that the winner of an election gets to hold the office for which that election was held.  “We” as Americans can disagree fiercely about all kinds of things, but “we” are no longer a “we” when we do not abide by the results of elections.  The state cannot exist if its office holders are not those who have been duly elected.  There is no political community left if elections are not respected.

Another point: Gaita’s description of treason holds better for Eastman and Clark (and the others in the Georgia indictment) than it does for Trump.  The co-conspirators have aided and abetted the enemy who is aiming to undermine the constitutive civic association.  But Trump is the enemy, not one who aids the enemy.  He aims to destroy the foundational commonality that makes the political entity called the United States possible.

I could get sidetracked into the legerdemain by which Trump and his followers would insist they are not trying to destroy America, but in fact save it (make it great again).  Not worth going down that rabbit hole.  But it is notable that they act in a way that would destroy the civic association, while also aiming to keep its infrastructure intact so that there are offices for them to occupy, state functions that they can take over.  That’s why there is an argument that their efforts were an attempt at a coup, not a full scale treasonous act whose goal was the utter destruction of a polity or of a “people.”

I don’t know if much hinges on deciding whether Trump and his henchmen are guilty of a failed coup attempt or of treason.  In both cases, they are certainly guilty of breaching the constitutive rules of American political and civic life.  They have manifestly failed to uphold and defend the Constitution, as many of them swore to do when they took their various oaths of office.

Another side note: the always cogent Timothy Burke has a blog post in which he wonders how anyone with even a modicum of sense would ever go to work for Trump (whose record of treating his helpers dismally is unambiguous and exists in plain sight).  Burke doesn’t have any good answers; he can only shake his head in disbelief.  Even if Trump is on the rise, no one ever benefits from hitching their wagon to his star.  His narcissism can’t abide sharing his triumphs (and whatever fruits those triumphs yield in the way of money, fame, or power) with anyone.  Of course, Burke’s puzzlement here only echoes the wider puzzlement over the cult of Trump among such a large share of the populace.  This recent CBS poll boggles the mind.  Among Republican voters, Trump is deemed more honest than everyone else in their lives by large margins.  (Even more than intimates, although the gap there is much lower.  Only 8% trust Trump more than their family members.)  So much for Hannah Arendt’s sophisticated take on the general cynicism generated by authoritarians, that is, the notion that everyone knows they are lying, but just think “everyone lies” and shrug.  No: the lies are believed; they are deemed the only truth out there.  (See NOTES below for references.)

But back to Gaita.  Because treason (on his take) “undermines . . . the conditions which make it possible for a people to speak as a people, . . . the most fitting (though not, any more, practical) punishment for unrepentant traitors . . . is banishment” (257).

What a lovely thought!  I don’t actually see why banishment is “not, any more, practical.” Surely we could send Trump abroad—wonderful to think he would flee to Saudi Arabia—and then keep him from re-entering the United States.) In any case, since banishment is not on the table, let’s at least indulge our fancies in thinking how appropriate the penalty would be in Trump’s case.  What he craves is admiration and adulation.  Deprive him of his audience, of the “people” to whom his plea for attention is made, let him fulminate in the emptiness of cyber-space entirely outside of the context (an actual civic association) to which his tweets are addressed.  Delicious.  The punishment would fit the criminal (and, possibly, also the crime) in a Dantesque manner.

NOTES

The Timothy Burke blog post on Trump’s henchmen. 

The CBS poll:  https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-poll-indictments-2023-08-20/

Here’s the most relevant finding in that poll, but it’s very much worth looking at the entire poll results (available through the link).

trump-truth.png

Finally, the relevant Hannah Arendt passage that has been making the rounds over the past eight years as pundits and others try to come to terms with the phenomenon of the Trump cult:

In an ever-changing, incomprehensible world the masses had reached the point where they would, at the same time, believe everything and nothing, think that everything was possible and nothing was true… The totalitarian mass leaders based their propaganda on the correct psychological assumption that, under such conditions, one could make people believe the most fantastic statements one day, and trust that if the next day they were given irrefutable proof of their falsehood, they would take refuge in cynicism; instead of deserting the leaders who had lied to them, they would protest that they had known all along that the statement was a lie and would admire the leaders for their superior tactical cleverness. (From The Origins of Totalitarianism)

Arendt’s take has proved both too sophisticated and too optimistic.  What we have seen instead is that no amount of “irrefutable proof” will lead the cultists to recognize the lie as a lie.  The cultists don’t have to retreat to the redoubt of cynicism.  They just double down on their belief in the original lie—and in the figure who propagates the lies.

“The New Earth” and the 1970s

I have just finished reading the novel, The New Earth, by Jess Row.  In many ways it is a mess of a book.  About a dysfunctional family, one that the novel overburdens with not one trauma, but five.  I won’t list them to avoid spoiling your reading pleasure.  But let’s just say that it’s three traumas too many.  And there is a jejune bit of meta-fiction (or postmodernist high jinks) running through the book, in which “the novel” announces its requirements in ways that add nothing to the impact or import of the novel.

That’s because, as is usually the case, the novel’s excellence comes from its portrayal of an array of characters and the ways in which they strive to navigate life in the United States from 1970 to the era of Trump. (There are some masterful meta-fictions in which character and mundane observation play no role.  So I am not saying it can’t be done.  But it is very hard to pull off, and most excellent novels do what novels have always done, dissect society through the travails of individual characters.)

To be clear: The New Earth is the best novel I have read recently. I highly recommend it, flaws and all.

A loud despair runs through Row’s book; by its end, the three children of the family have declared the US unlivable—and take their father off with them into exile.  In one way, that’s why the multiple traumas are too much.  We don’t need over the top horrors to understand why people suffer in the contemporary US.  Enough to register the cruelties of everyday life—and the helplessness many of us feel about doing anything to remedy them.  The most sympathetic of the novel’s characters is the daughter who works as a lawyer trying to help terrified immigrants in Trump’s America.  We see how she is overwhelmed, with far too many cases than she could ever effectively handle, and fighting a judicial bureaucracy that even when it is not being deliberately cruel (which happens often enough) is battered into indifference by also being overburdened.

In short, the novel is just about the best account I have read of the pain and fear that comes from living in the contemporary world.  The family’s other daughter joins a peace group trying to protect Palestinians from Israeli settlers, so the horrors are not confined to the US. 

Not surprisingly, the novel has nothing to offer in the way of solutions—except finding a separate peace.  The characters leave the US in search of that peace, hiding out from history as it were, and tending to their own gardens.

Which leads me to the 1970s.  The parents of the dysfunctional family spend a fraught few years in the middle 70s in a Vermont commune presided over by a Japanese Zen master.  The novel does a marvelous job capturing the spirit of the 70s—which was a decade of separate peace making.  The failures of the revolutionary, transformative hopes of the 60s yielded the small-scale, personalized experiments of the 70s.  I know that’s a cliché, but Row makes it take on flesh.  The search for alternatives was real—and while never a mass movement, it did motivate a fairly large sub-culture. 

And Row’s novel ponders why it all fell apart.  Why, as if determined to show Margaret Thatcher was right when she declared there are no alternatives, a belief in other ways of living, in an ability to create and sustain those other ways, just dissipated, leaving nary a trace behind.  It all just disappeared: the hope, the experiments, the conviction that mainstream society was not just cruel, but fully and truly insane. The determination to have no part in that insane society–and the various ways people actually acted on that determination. Not some fantasy of moving to Canada, but setting out to establish communities where a different life could be lived and sustained. The novel’s ending–with its surviving characters going into exile–both reprises the 70s despairing conclusion that only a separate peace is possible with the added despair of not even believing one can, with friends, create the place of that separate peace. No running away to create a community, just running away, is all we can manage to imagine (and sometimes, although rarely, do) in the 2020s. After all, how many people really do move to Canada?

I graduated from college in 1974 and immediately started grad school in the fall of that year.  I didn’t know anyone who was dropping out to pursue some utopian alternative.  My fellow students at Georgetown were disappointedly conventional and conservative.  No doubt most of them voted for Reagan a few years down the road.  The atmosphere at Buffalo was entirely different.  I had traded conservative kids from Northeastern Catholic high schools for Jewish grad students, a surprising number of whom were “red diaper” babies.  From being just about the most radical kid on campus in DC, I went to being a boring middle-of-the-roader in upstate NY. 

Grad school in Buffalo during those years was a mess; apparently its teetering on the edge of anarchistic chaos was the after effect of its actually having been mired in anarchistic chaos in the years from 1968 to 1972.  A kind of fragile order had been restored, but there was still a lot of pulling in various contradictory directions, basically filling the whole spectrum from the Trotskyite Sparticus revolutionaries to the careerist academics on the faculty and in the grad student ranks.  The careerists were on the defensive and a distinct minority in Buffalo.  It wasn’t until I got to Berkeley in 1977 that I encountered true academic careerism in all its tedium and stuffiness.  The kind of place where people would not venture an opinion because something “was not in their field” and where obsession with the “profession’s” pecking order, both locally and nationally, was as pronounced as any minor Austen character’s constantly reaching for his Debrett’s. 

All of this to say that in Buffalo one could imagine that academics was itself an alternative.  Having one’s cake and eating it too.  Certainly that was the case for me.  After all, I ended up in Buffalo halfway by mistake.  I would have gone to Yale or Cornell if they would have had me.  I did know that Buffalo was at the forefront of “theory”—in which I was interested.  But I would have gone to deadly conservative Minnesota if they had given me a better stipend.  So I wandered into the Buffalo anarchy with only the dimmest idea of what I was getting into.

But I had been reading the various radical tracts of the 60s—Marcuse, N. O. Brown, Charles Reich, Philip Slater.  So I did have the image of books that could intervene in the here and now, that were promoting alternatives, that were paving the way toward a transformed world.  So I was primed already to think I was preparing myself to be a similar kind of prophet, one who mobilized ideas to move the world forward. 

I think it is that image of an audience that meant I could never have fled into a commune.  Prudence no doubt also played a huge part.  I wanted/needed a job, a sinecure if you will.  Already in 1974 the American Philosophical Society was warning prospective graduate students that their job prospects were iffy.  A professor of mine at Georgetown ran into me the summer of 1974.  When he learned I was going to grad school, he advised me to learn a trade—carpentry or electricity—along the way, so I would have something to fall back on.  A far different take (and a more refreshing one) than my encounter in 1978 with one of the Berkeley professors I had gotten to know.  I told him I was doing adjunct work for $900 a course at the University of San Francisco while I looked for a tenure track job.  What kind of tenure track job, he asked.  In my dreams, a liberal arts college.  Well, he replied, have you contacted Reed?

Back to prudence.  I couldn’t step off the pier into the unknown of a commune.  But I also couldn’t do it because I wanted to address the world.  I wanted to be a writer and I wanted an audience.  So I needed to believe (and it proved, eventually, approximately true) that the academy would afford me the freedom and autonomy and financial means to do my own thing, to pursue what interested me and what I thought should interest (and influence) others.  There was a long apprenticeship, with freedom only coming after tenure, but the academy did deliver something like an alternative way of living—even if the dreams of influencing others, of contributing to a transformation of America life, did not (could not?) come to fruition. 

Thus, my own 1970s hopes were dashed; the robust goals of dramatic change scaled back to the miniature spaces of the classroom and the family.  Even my efforts at transforming academic culture came to naught.  I spent most of my academic career at UNC trying to break the strangleholds of departments and of individually conducted research in how the university organized itself and how faculty experienced their careers.  To no avail.  Nothing I did in that regard had even a minimal impact.

True, UNC is a particularly conservative place.  True interdisciplinary structures and fantastic collaborative work have been introduced and have flourished in other places.  But I couldn’t get UNC to move in those directions.  I had plenty of co-conspirators (so my use of “I” here is misleading), but we failed.

In other words, I ended up with my own separate peace.  I had a more than satisfactory career, in terms of loving my students and the classes I taught, in terms of writing what I wanted to write to the best of my abilities, in terms of the respect and regard of my students and colleagues.  But nothing I did made any difference in terms of providing alternatives to the way life is organized and lived in the US.  I could only watch—as so many of my generation did—while the dominant mode (call it “neoliberalism” if you will; I have called it “the return of ruthless capitalism”) only tightened its grip on every corner of the world.

That tightening grip somehow—and this is where Row’s novel is very strong—also obliterated the pockets of alternative communes and their like.  Somehow?  After all, what threat were a few scattered dissident communities, far from the mainstream, tiny in their numbers and their power?  Yet they, too, had to be driven into the maw.  Swallowed whole and made extinct.

How?  Part of the story is the inflation of the late 1970s.  It is hard to convey to people today how cheap life was in the early 70s.  My grad stipend was $270 a month; if you were paying $75 a month for rent in Buffalo in 1974, you hadn’t looked hard enough.  If you had no income, no steady job, you couldn’t expect raises that at least took inflation into account even if lagging behind.  Things that could be done for almost no money in 1972 (like finding a place in the country and scraping by on what you could grow and casual labor) were impossible by 1978.  Poverty—real, soul and body destroying poverty—drove people off the communes as the decade unfolded.

There were multiple other causes as well.  But I want to return—and end—with this question of audience.  The communes were always, to some extent, demonstration projects.  They were meant to prove to a skeptical world (which, in reality, might shrink down to skeptical parents and other family members) that an alternative was possible.  But you couldn’t go into a commune unless you also had very strong ties to your fellow communards; they were the audience you were most cathected to.

That’s where I didn’t have it.  I was cathected to the imaginary audience of readers.  Those were the people I wanted to address.  I had turned my back on my parents, had succeeded to a large extent in not caring a whit if they approved of what I was doing or not.  We didn’t share any values by that point; they were Catholic Goldwater Republicans.  My only retained inheritance from them was a strong commitment and emotional attachment to monogamy.  I had no interest in or sympathy for 70s sexual experimentation or revolution, although very sympathetic with both feminism and the gay liberation movement. 

In any case, I was not attached to a local audience or community.  The lack of such ties meant setting off into the woods with a small group of like-minded others was never a possibility for me.  But, inevitably, the courage and romance of that attracts my admiration.  And the failure of those efforts both disheartens and intrigues me.  Why couldn’t they by sustained?  And why, today, have we gotten to the point where such utopian efforts don’t even exist any more?  A total loss of hope—and of vision—and of deep attachments to a cadre of others. 

We are thrown back on the family—or on church communities.  There is almost nothing else in the way of lived solidarities out there. Especially if we think of institutional supports for those solidarities. Yes, there are networks of friends, but never organized into ways of life, or (perhaps more radically) ways of sustaining life, of securing the basic necessities.  For that, you must go to the market; you can’t provide them for yourself through a small-scale collaboration with friends. 

That’s what the demise of the 70s spirit means.  Experiments are no longer even tried.  Everyone buckles under to the imperatives of the marketplace and to the intolerances of a society that scorns all alternatives and punishes those who, for whatever reason, cannot manage or refuse to bow to the demands of the market.  A society that visits the economic sins of the fathers on their offspring, making it well nigh impossible to climb out of the pit of poverty. 

So, yes, I miss the 70s with its sense of possibilities.  I was mostly a by-stander to, not a participant in, its experiments, which does seem a lamentable prudence.  But I was a fellow traveler in the sense of being a sympathizer.  I wanted the experimenters to succeed.  I hated the inevitable smug “I told you so” that followed the multiple failures.  I could mostly overlook the experimenters’ excesses and their often ludicrous rhetoric in order to honor their courage in trying to forge a new path.  And I can feel very melancholy when I read a novel like “The New Earth” and experience afresh the hopes that drove so many 70s alternatives and the eventual crushing of those hopes.

Justice and American Politics

I want to open by saying (which will prove ironic in light of what I want to say) that I am currently reading Dante’s Divine Comedy for my sins.

I have elsewhere said that I think the fundamental dividing line between right and left in US politics can be quickly characterized by their different understandings of what justice means.  To be blunt: I think this is one of the two or three most cogent and valuable insights I have had in my life.  So I violate my usual rule of not repeating myself to express the basic idea again in this post.

It’s not like anything I have ever proposed in print has been taken up by others.  But this one insight I do think could be of use, so it disturbs my sangfroid in ways the general disregard for my writings does not.

Here’s the basic idea—and how it relates to Dante.  In the Paradiso, Canto 7, Dante is at pains to explain the logic of the Crucifixion.  Basically, he says that forgiveness of an offense is not enough.  Justice is not served unless there is also “atonement.”  Some price must be exacted in order to cancel the debt the offense has created.  (These economic metaphors are completely and utterly inescapable once some “payment” is required for having done wrong.  Similarly, one cannot avoid talking about “reward” for good deeds when operating within the same paradigm.)

Of course, Dante’s Inferno is the place for individualized atonement—and Dante can barely conceal his glee that the big reprobates have to pay the price forever.  No atonement can suffice in their case.  The Crucifixion is about atonement for original sin, for the whole mass of human sins. Canto 7 explains why only the suffering of Christ could erase that stain. God can’t just forgive mankind its misdeeds. (Of course, it’s easy to ask “why not?” And it won’t surprise you that Dante’s answer to that question is tortured and not very convincing. His answer: humans, via Adam’s sin, had fallen from the perfection with which they were created. Being imperfect, humans could not themselves restore their perfection. Only God could do that–and he could only do it be becoming human himself and “atoning” for Adam’s sin by suffering death by Crucifixion. And answer that raises more questions than it answers–in my humble opinion.)

When it comes to individualized punishment in hell, Dante is usually a bit too human to rejoice in the sufferings endured by those he encounters, but he has no doubt of the justice of their being there, as stated (among other instances) in lines 10-12 of Canto 15 of the Paradiso.  “It is well the he grieve without end who, for love of a thing that does not last eternally, divests himself of that other love” (where the “other love” is the love for and of God, a love that does last eternally.) There is just no atonement at all available for some people.

In short, there is always a soupcon of sadism and of self-satisfaction in the justice that motivates the right: people should get what they deserve.  So the bad guys should be punished, and the good guys (me!) deserve all the rewards you can pile up.  Meritocracy with a vengeance (quite literally).

The harshness is the point; it cannot be siphoned out to create some sort of “compassionate conservatism.”  Even if the paternalism imagined in compassionate conservatism were to be enacted, it would be within the strict limits of the family (i.e. citizenry).  Dubya may actually have been a sincerely compassionate guy, a true believer in No Child Left Behind (a noble slogan after all).  But the compassion was certainly not going to extend to Afghans or Iraqis.  The right is fueled by righteous indignation—and the desire to meet out punishment to those who “deserve” it, while augmenting the spoils divided up among the blessed. 

That’s why American conservatism is shot through and through with a certain version of Christianity.  Meritocracy—and the outraged sense that taxes take my hard-earned and well-deserved wealth and give it to the unworthy—is just another version of a religion built upon dividing sinners from non-sinners, and equating justice with the sinners getting hell and the non-sinners getting heaven.

Leftists are talking of something altogether different when they talk of justice.  Maybe you could torture the left wing notion of justice into the language of “desert.”  But the idea centers on what people deserve by the basic fact of being human.  What we owe to one another as humans.  Some basic set of ways to satisfy fundamental material and psychological/social needs.  The things required to render a life worth living.  The means to forging a flourishing life.  Shame unto the society that begrudges those things to any in its midst. Such a society is unjust.

The left’s idea of justice has some Biblical sources as well (of course).  But as Dante’s poem reminds us: ministers of vengeance and cupidity seem to usually have the upper hand in the Christian churches.  There are always heathens and heretics at the door—and surely god does not want you to extend a helping hand to them.  All that love your enemies stuff is overwritten by the doctrine of god’s eventual justice, of the fact of hell. If even God can’t love wicked humans, but sends them to hell, then there is a definite limit to what enemies you are enjoined to love.

So the two sides talk past one another.  The right sees threats, enemies, and (simply in some cases) the undeserving.  The reprobate not only bring suffering upon themselves,  but it also outrageous if society does not act to punish them, to make them pay for their waywardness. Why leave punishment to the next world when you can get the jump of divine vengeance in this one?

The left (bleeding heart liberals) saves its indignation for the cruelty of a society that treats those it deems unworthy so harshly.  Its cries for justice are for society to do right by these neglected souls, not to heap more suffering upon them.