The Only Wealth Is Life

In Unto This Last, John Ruskin declares that the “only wealth is life.’  There is something deeply attractive to me in this absolute declaration.  Here my spade turns.  Whatever does not avail to life, Ruskin adds, we should designate “illth, for we ought to have a corresponding term” to wealth, one that designates those things that impede or even actively destroy life.  (pp. 209, 211 in Penguin edition.)

To take “life” as one’s standard of value means that, at a minimum, that which provides for the material goods required for subsistence is good.  For starters, it would seem we need to supplement that standard with the proviso that all are equally entitled to “life”—from which it follows that all should have the means to sustain life.  When it comes to mere existence (what the new discourse is calling “bare life,” having resurrected the term zoe out of Aristotle’s work), no life is more valuable than another.  Life is a non-discriminating term.  “I know when one is dead and when one lives,” says Lear (V, iii, 264), and that basic difference is all that counts.  We should value, Ruskin is saying, everything (whether it be food, or a way of arranging human and social affairs) that contributes to sustaining life and delaying death.

What appalls Ruskin—and me—is that, despite the lip service we pay to life as, if not the highest, at least a recognizable, good, we hardly act that way.  “We usually speak as if death pursued us, and we fled from him; but that is so in only rare instances.  Ordinarily he masks himself—makes himself beautiful—all-glorious; not like the King’s daughter, all glorious within, but outwardly: his clothing of wrought gold.  We pursue him frantically all our days, he flying or hidden from us” (190).  Our actions belie our devotion to life since so much of what we do is death-dealing, either for ourselves or for others.  Isn’t it enough that nature brings pestilence, famine, and death?  Do human actions have to add to those burdens?

Yet even Ruskin—as determined a seeker of firm, absolute values as any writer I know—cannot maintain “life” as an unqualified standard.  He, too, like almost all writers on the subject is moved to consider what makes a life worth living (to borrow William James’s phrase).  It seems impossible to view all lives as equal or equivalent.  We are pushed to judge among lives, to compare them, to see some as more valuable than others.  For Ruskin, this evaluation takes the form of assessing various modes of living in the world as contributing to the promotion of life.  “Five great intellectual professions, relating to the daily necessities of life, have hitherto existed,” he tells us:

The Soldier’s profession is to defend it.

The Pastor’s to teach it.

The Physician’s to keep it in health.

The Lawyer’s to enforce justice in it.

The Merchant’s to provide for it. (177).

And the value of these lives, when we come to judge them, is not only determined by how well different individuals performed the professional task they assumed, but (crucially) rests on the willingness of those individuals to die instead of failing to perform that task.

“[T] duty of all these men is, on due occasion, to die for it [i.e. life].

“on due occasion,’ namely—

The Soldier, rather than leave his post in battle.

The Physician, rather than leave his post in plague.

The Paston, rather than teach Falsehood.

The Lawyer, rather than countenance Injustice.

The Merchant—what is his “due occasion” of death?

It is the main question for the merchant, as for all of us.  For, truly, the man who does not know when to die, does not know how to live (177).

What happened to the supreme value of life?  It has evaporated in front of us—or, at the very least, some individual lives must willing accept death “on due occasion” in order to promote the general life (of the species?, of a more circumscribed community?).  A life not devoted to the furthering of life is a life not worth living.  Integrity to that purpose, faithfulness to duty, could require death.  And if one does not acknowledge the claim death has upon him in such instances, one “does not know how to live.”

So, it seems, life is not such a simple matter.  One has to learn how to live.  Or maybe it is better to say that one has to self-consciously, reflexively, assess one’s life in light of the standard to promote life—and then judge if one’s life meets the standard.  A certain reading of Nietzsche would see him as precisely scorning this sort of evaluation.  Living creatures should pursue life—its continuation and the pleasures it might afford along with the sufferings that it entails—period.  No second thoughts, no regrets, no judgments of good and evil.  Any evaluation beyond seeing something as “good” because it avails life or “bad” because it impedes it only hinders life’s full expression.  To affirm life unreservedly is to damn the consequences in ways that Ruskin cannot bring himself to do.

The sticking point is, as Esposito (in Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy) makes clear in his chapter on Nietzsche, is that Nietzsche denies that it is either possible or desirable to “preserve life through the abolition of conflict” (85).  Life is only abundant, only fully realized, in conflict.  Thus, life cannot be sequestered from death; life is, to a large extent, the infliction of death.  In the most basic terms, this boils down to the fact that life feeds on other lives.  Everything that eats must kill some other living creature for its food.  If every creature (as the conatus doctrine in Spinoza asserts) aims to persist in its own mode of being, the life is sustained only through the destruction of some conative beings by other conative beings.  There are no willing sacrificial victims to life’s persistent hunger.  In order to sustain life, we must kill.

It is this logic that I am trying to puzzle out.  Lots of different ways to go from here.  One is the Girard route, toward the idea that the sacrifice is inevitable, and thus the issue is whether the sacrifice will be imposed on another creature or assumed by one’s self.  Freely chosen self-sacrifice (the model is Jesus Christ) is the only path to peace.

A different track leads to my opening concern.  If Nietzsche states some fundamental law of life, then how come Foucault, Arendt, Taylor etc. seem to think that a special attention to life is a “modern” development—and that this “special attention” leads to death-dealing polities/societies.  Why is the attempt to preserve life, an attempt to fend off the Nietzschean fatalism about the inevitability of conflict, a formula for increasing the violence some humans direct toward others.  And, finally, I also want to consider how “bare life” is not enough, so that (on the one hand) we have the appeal of the Aristotelean notion of “flourishing” (a la Martha Nussbaum) and (on the other hand) we can think of lives not worth living (leading to issues of assisted suicide as well as unassisted suicide).

I’ll see how far I get in subsequent posts.

Giovanni Arrighi’s The Long Twentieth Century

I am about 2/3rds of the way through The Long Twentieth Century, which has been a slog, but also worth the effort.  I will get back to the “life” stuff in subsequent posts, but want to pick up on three points from Arrighi today.

One: Arrighi is a fairly orthodox Marxist in that he firmly believes that economics drives history and, in particular, offers the explanatory causes for all armed conflicts.  Even more fundamentally, he believes that the exigencies of profit are the main drivers of all economic activity.  There is a logic to how and where profit can be made, as well as cycles that move capital from seeking profit through trade to seeking it through financial transactions.  Individual actors in capitalism have few, if any, options.  They must do what profit demands in any particular situation.  The iron laws of capitalism rule.

Interestingly, however, Arrighi recognizes that no profit could even be made if all actors only pursued profit.  Thus, he must posit that some people are otherwise motivated.  If everyone were motivated by profit, trade would come to a standstill because no one would make trades unless able to make a profit—and profit, finally, is a zero-sum game.  It is zero-sum because, unlike the fantasized barter exchange that is equally advantageous because I need eggs and your need clothes, the introduction of money translates all exchanges into the same currency.  I only make a profit if the eggs I exchange for clothes are worth less in monetary terms than the sum you give me, part of which I expend on clothes, the rest of which I pocket as profit. (Kiernan had a friend once who refused to sell any properties in Monopoly because his older sister had so consistently taken advantage of him in the past.  The result was an endless game, because no one could ever go bankrupt if not monopolies ever got formed.  That might prove a functioning economy, but it certainly isn’t a capitalist one.)

So what motivates people besides profit?  Arrighi answer (which, unfortunately, he doesn’t develop at all) is “power and prestige.”  War provides a consistent boon for those seeking profit—and most wars, he seems to think, are actually motivated by the need to protect or to expand sources of profit.  But he does seem to admit that aggrandizement, the quest for power and status apart from profit, can also motivate conflict, competition, and war.  And the profit seekers are more than glad to, in Country Joe’s words, “supply the army with the tools of the trade.”  War is not only a great consumer of merchandise (manufactured goods) but also a major source of debt (i.e. of profits for financial capital).  The potlatch that is war serves profit precisely because it does not seek profit itself, representing a different desire instead, one that cold-eyed profit seekers can exploit.

There are, of course, other ways to seek status besides war—and that leads us to topic number two.

Two: We are familiar with “crises of overproduction,” the paradoxical creation of poverty during economic downturns where the problem is not a scarcity of goods, but a surfeit of them.  Less often noted is the problem of a surfeit of capital, a crisis of “over-accumulation.”  Arrighi is particularly good on this species of crisis, one that seems particularly acute in our day and age.  For starters, the two types of crises can be (although they need not be) related. When markets are saturated, when there is not sufficient demand to meet supply and hence production is slowed because there is too much stuff around and no place to sell it, then capital might also begin to accumulate for lack of any place to invest it.  You can’t put the capital to work because there is no need for increased production.

In this situation, capital will move from production to financial markets.  Arrighi, in fact, believes that this movement from relying on commodities for profits to relying on selling money to make profits is the grand cycle of capitalism, with the movement to finance capital in the world’s dominant economy—first the Italian city-states, then the Dutch, then the British, then the US—marking the moment of transition from one site of dominance to the next.  The newcomer begins by taking over production from its predecessor until it, too, exhausts the profit capacities of production and moves into finance.  In this vision, the US, having moved from production to finance somewhere in the 1970s is in decline, with Asia bidding to become the next hegemonic capitalist site.

One possibility, then, is for capital to move from the former hegemonic site of production (the US) to the new one (China).  But, for fairly obvious reasons, capital is not entirely mobile.  For one thing, nationalist sentiments weigh against allowing the importation of too much “foreign capital.”  There are also risk factors: the worry that foreign lands might not be stable.  And there are transaction costs of moving into a different legal/banking regime and working in a different currency.

For various reasons, then, some (at least) excess capital will desire to stay home.  And that leads to bubbles and to creative “financial instruments” and to Ponzi schemes and other forms of fraud.  The bubbles, I would argue, are always often tied to status.  The inflated value of the “bubbled thing” (if I can invent a term) relies not simply on its supposed ability to be cashed in for a certain sum, but also for the prestige of owning such an expensive, highly valued commodity.  Currently, real estate and art works clearly play this role.  They are great places to park excess money, because they can be rationalized as investments, not just frivolous spending.  But owning a New York apartment or a painting by Monet is also conspicuous consumption.  More bang for the buck: prestige plus a profit to be made.

Another factor drives bubbles, I think.  The search for safety.  That seems paradoxical since bubbles contain enormous risks—if we believe that value must, in the final instance, be tied back to something “real.”  A very different dynamic is at work, I think.  The world is a dangerous, unstable place—and seems more dangerous every day.  (That fear of its dangerousness is, most likely, pretty constant across time.  There are always ample reasons for fear.)  The money being parked in New York and London and Vancouver real estate and in paintings by the masters is money being siphoned out of risky environments and salted away in places perceived as safe.  The American who buys a high-end New York apartment can’t find a better place to invest his excess capital.  The Chinese citizen who does the same is squirreling away his excess capital in a safe place.  Both acquire the prestige of having a place in New York.

The quest for status does lend itself to expenditures that are pretty much complete financial losses: high-end clothes and accessories, fancy vacations.  There is money to be made in the luxury trades and never more so than in times of slack production and excess capital.  Education is a funny hybrid in such times.  It is clearly a prestige item—the fancy prep schools, the elite colleges—but can also be rationalized as an investment.  It is hard to know if the return on investment (given the differential in initial outlay) for going to Harvard exceeds that of going to Grand Rapid State—mostly because the place from which the respective students start is so vastly different that the assessment of eventual outcomes (in terms of income or of other measures of economic well-being) cannot isolate the specific contribution of the degree.  But people love to spend money on things they think can also be justified as “investments.”  One need only look at the immense sums American parents are spending on sports training/competition for their children, justified as possibly leading to that child getting a scholarship to college.

In sum, profit depends on their being other powerful motives that overrule profit for some people.  As Marx put it on the more basic level of the material needs for subsistence, capitalism is in the business of turning your needs into weaknesses that it can exploit. The whole thing doesn’t work if there aren’t some people who do not pursue profit relentlessly and to the exclusion of all else.

Three: Arrighi argues that a major innovation of the American century, the time of its economic hegemony which encompasses the “long twentieth century” of his title, is the modern corporation.  In particular, the modern corporation—think Ford, Exxon, Kodak, Ma Bell—combined mass production with mass marketing.  These companies used the fact of being first in producing some product to gain massive market share by aggressively organizing its distribution and advertising operations.  Newcomers (i.e. potential competitors), Arrighi argues, did not face overwhelming technical obstacles to produce products with the same efficiency as the first-comers.  What the newcomers lacked was a way to crack into the market in sufficient volume to underwrite the capital costs of mass production.  Organizing the market in ways that orient it toward one’s firm is equally as necessary as establishing an efficient mode of production.  Where the two do not co-exist, the firm will not thrive.

On the one hand, this assertion still seems true.  Apple and Google and Amazon are prime examples.  They were, in some ways, technical innovators, although there were certainly personal computer makers in the 1980s who were Apple’s equals, and Amazon never did anything all that innovative technically.  In Arrighi’s words, “the transnational corporations that emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries . . . were strictly business organizations [i.e.  were not state/business hybrids like the East India Company and South Africa Company of the British hegemonic period] specialized functionally in a particular line of business across multiple territories and jurisdictions” (250-51).  They integrated “the process of mass production with those of mass distribution within a single organization” (248).

It occurs to me that a similar “crowding out” operates in politics.  The difficulties of forming a “third part” or a new lobbying firm or a new social movement are enhanced by the presence of highly organized players already on the field.  Thus, for example, there is no strong anti-NRA group.  MADD (Mothers Against Drunk Driving) might be a counter-example—and provide a model for those in favor of gun control to follow.  Of course, there was hardly a strong lobby for drunk driving, the way that the NRA is a strong lobby against gun control.  In any case, the advantages of being there first are only secured by also being organized.  An organized player in the field only attracts more resources by virtue of their power and visibility.  And, for that reason, I think (as has been a theme of so many of my musings) that the anarchist love of leaderless, horizontal, non-organized action so prevalent in many radical circles today is a losing strategy.  Organization (money, boots on the ground, a well-articulated set of objectives, and a coherent strategy for advancing toward those objectives, a strategy followed consistently by the organization’s members) will defeat an amorphous protest group every time.

And yet, on the other hand, the whole point of Boltanksi and Chiapello’s The New Spirit of Capitalism is that the monster corporations of the middle twentieth century are dinosaurs, too cumbersome to respond quickly and adroitly to rapidly changing conditions on the ground.  IBM is just one poster child (GM and GE are others) for the supposed liabilities of the big firm.  Paired down, focused firms like Toyota, Southwest Airlines, and Dell computers can take on the big boys—and win—because they can keep costs down and quality high.  It is hardly that these successful new firms are unorganized.  But the organization is highly decentralized; responsibility for different aspects of the operation are widely dispersed—including, in many cases, to other firms who, by way of contract, provide key support services or even key component parts.  Such “outsourcing,” whether overseas or domestic, drives down costs, even as it increases accountability.

In politics, then, aspirant newcomers might want to consider how to play the disadvantages of size against the established players, the existing parties.  I must admit I am not sure how that would work.  For all the supposed “down-sizing” of the big dinosaurs in order to become leaner (and definitely meaner), it is not as if market share has changed all that drastically.  Coke and Pepsi still dominate the soft drink business; the big breweries buy up craft breweries almost as quickly as Apple and Google buy out any possible competitors.  I guess I would say that today’s firms are less uptight than the GM of 1950 about the need to do everything in-house, the need to be the employer of record of everyone whose work was needed to make the company function.  But today’s firms are even more obsessed with controlling the market.  Hence the endless customer satisfaction research.

Enough for now.  The big question still looms—as it always does for me.  What causes (there were obviously several) explain the “return of ruthless capitalism.”  Why were labor costs and profit levels that were deemed satisfactory in 1960 were no longer acceptable to capitalists in 1980?

Biopolitics and Racism

One quick note as an addendum to the first entry on Biopower/Biopolitics.  If we think of the diet and exercise industries, we can identify a non-state source of pressure on selves to toe the line as regards health, longevity etc.  And that pressure feeds fairly directly into the creation of markets to be exploited by commercial interests.  So biopower is hardly confined to states.

The racism argument, made briefly by Foucault and treated at greater length by Esposito in Bios, is a fairly straightforward version of the claim that an attention to preserving life leads to the infliction of death.  (We can see here a version of the “perversity” style of argument that Hirschman sees as dear to conservatives: namely the claim that efforts to do A—in this case to preserve life—in fact lead directly to an outcome that is not-A—the exact opposite of A—an increase in deaths.)

Basically, the claim is that efforts to preserve life will, inevitably, lead to identifying various threats to life, various agents that will cause life to cease.  Those agents are, then, slated for preventive destruction.  A simple case would be pesticides.  In order the insure the health and life of my crops I must kill the pests (insects/molds/funghi/weeds etc.) that threaten the crops.  Esposito shows how this logic feeds directly into Nazi thinking.  The Jews were pests that threatened the health of the German people—and hence had to be exterminated.  The killing of Jews was persistently justified in the name of health.  Similarly, Nazi eugenics and euthanasia were understood in relation to a notion of “lives not worth living,” i.e. life itself was judged according to criteria that designated some lives as not up to the mark.  (I will devote a future post to this conundrum since it brings up the issue of old age so directly).

Judith Butler’s recent work has focused just here: how is it that some lives are deemed more valuable than others?  Or, as she puts it, whose life is grievable?  We could translate from there over to Martha Nussbaum: how come only some get to have a flourishing life?  What are the criteria by which some are denied access to the necessaries that sustain life?  One criteria can be racist—whole categories of people are outside the circle of the worthy.

One question then: is it “inevitable” (a word Esposito loves) that protecting life requires designating enemies to life that must be eliminated.  This might be called the negative path.  There is also a positive path (the one I always associate with Dickens’s Great Expectations.)  Here the realization is that the sustaining of life can only come at the expense of other lives.  We all must eat—and so some living things must be eaten.  At that basic level, as Dickens sees it, we are all criminals.  Being alive is just proof that you have participated in the killing of something.  Life is paired inextricably with death—and the only two alternatives are self-sacrifice or the sacrifice of the not-self.  No innocent life.

The problem with a claim that large is that it seems universal—an absolute condition of life everywhere and everywhen.  But Arendt, Taylor, Foucualt and the rest are trying to make a claim specific to modernity, a claim that there was some kind of fundamental shift, characterized as the moment that the polity took the preservation of life as its chief focus and justification.  And if racism is a modern phenomenon (as many historians and theorists have argued), then there would have to be a connection of that racism with the new prioritization of life.  I don’t see the connection, or at least am not convinced that is the connection at work here.  Racism, certainly as it pertains to both Jews and Africans, is economically convenient in the European exploitation of the non-European world.  So I don’t see that we need biopower to explain racism.  What seems qualitatively different about Nazi racism is its roots in a discourse of health and its economic non-rationality.  The wholesale killing of Africans in the Atlantic slave trade was a cost of doing business, but killing Africans was not the direct purpose.  There was no economic gain to be had from a dead African.  But the Nazis (beyond stealing the resources of the Jews) had little to gain economically from genocide.  Their logic (if we can even use that term) does seem to refer to some kind of notion of disease, infection, immunization etc.  They were not about sustaining life economically, but about protecting life against dire external threats.

What gets left out, it seems to me, of Esposito’s mostly convincing account of the Nazis is hatred.  To focus on the “logic” that underlines their genocidal program is to miss the hatred that animates it, that renders killing a positive pleasure, an act in which one self-righteously indulges a most satisfying sense of vindication, of revenge, of seeing justice done.  Can those feelings really be traced back to a desire to preserve life?  Seems more the idea that these others (the Jews for Nazis, the blacks for the white Trump supporters that Arlie Hochshild describes in her book) have stolen something that is rightfully mine?  And it isn’t life they have stolen: it is dignity, recognition, legitimacy, status.  They seem to be thought of as more “worthy” (along some dimension) than me in the current social milieu. They get all the favors.  More in the “Mom always loved you best” mode than in terms of direct threats to my life.  Injustice, not fear for one’s vey life, is the motor, I would say.  A mixture of envy and indignation.

So I am not yet ready to buy that a focus on life as the highest good necessarily has the perverse outcome of increasing violence, of increasing the state’s proclivity to inflict death.

Another problem is Thucydides, or Steven Pinker.  It is just not obvious that modern states inflict death at any higher rate than premodern ones.  Pinker, of course, argues that violence is on the decline, that the obvious result of the Enlightenment movement toward notions of equality is exactly the result we have gotten: less wholesale killing.  In other words, the new valuation of life, which includes extending the right to life to the lowest born, did not have a perverse effect but had, in fact, the effects that we would predict to most directly follow.  Valuing life leads to a better deal for more people.  Placing power at the service of life leads to longer lives and fewer violent (human-inflicted) deaths.

The deep resistance of the left to all narratives of progress, to any suggestion that modernity is (at least in some ways) better than what preceded it, has (I would venture to guess) multiple causes.  A hatred of complacency mixes with a fear that we will settle for a half loaf where we should be striving for a full one.  But there is a deep incoherence in rejecting all ideas of progress in the name of a standard—the full loaf—yet to be reached.  A standard gives you something to measure by.  And once you are in the realm of measurement, then you have established a line along which progress can be tracked.  I guess Foucault could retreat to saying that all societies are unfree; they are just unfree is different ways.  But, even then, we would be tempted to judge some variants of unfreedom as more onerous than others.  Make the struggle against unfreedom as local and specific as you like; the struggle is still going to be toward something—either toward the removal of some form of oppression or the installation of some less onerous way of doing/arranging things.  We know better and worse in many circumstances—and all we need to some idea of progress is some notion of better and worse.

In short, I am hardly going to deny the violence of modern states.  But I am not convinced that that violence is generated or augmented by a devotion to the value of life.  I am much more inclined to say that the value placed on life is a brake (yes, a mostly, although not entirely, ineffective one) on even more violence.  Mass anti-war movements, large-scale dissent from a state’s war-making, is a modern phenomenon.  That we are even having this conversation seems to testimony to a transvaluation of values that can, conveniently, be described in terms of a heightened reverence for life.

Similarly, racism still seems to me best combatted by a generalized valuation of life.  Two things seem involved here: one, identifying something we value that is shared across whatever boundaries our categories can fabricate or our cultures erect, and two, identifying that shared thing’s vulnerability in relation to the fact that it can quite easily be lost.  Life’s value is established vis a vis the death we aim to delay, especially in relation to keeping humans from inflicting death upon one another.  I just don’t see how that worthy goal somehow (perversely) ends up causing more deaths than would have occurred if we didn’t set life at such a high value.

More thoughts about all this to come, including looking at Arendt and Taylor more specifically, trying to think about the logic of sacrifice, and questions about whether some lives are not worth living.

Roland Flint

I have been indulging myself lately, writing a day book for this year of 2018.  Writing something each day, ranging from what is happening now to dwellings on various past events/feelings/friends.  Today I was writing about my in-built aversion to father-figures.  I never had one and don’t think I ever wanted one.  But that made me wonder about teachers I have admired and loved over the years, people who taught me many things.  My sense was that I adopted my ways of being in the world more from friends than from teachers.  I learned from my teachers, but was never inclined to imitate them.  That kind of stealing I saved for my friends.  Maybe because I felt some kind of barrier—one of age or of non- intimacy—that kept teachers from being fully real to me.

But these thoughts of teachers sent me to Google.  And Roland Flint has a fairly significant web presence.  Here’s the best site, complete with some poems and a fairly full biography.

I only know so much about Roland because he wore his heart on his sleeve in his poetry.  We never talked of these things—although I was a student in his Faulkner seminar (the only class I ever took with him) that horrible fall when his six year old son was killed by a car.  It was about four weeks into the semester; he was then gone for another month at least, with various guest teachers carrying on for him.  Before he came back to teach, he was at a Georgetown football game in the rain.  There was a crowd of about 50 people (at most) watching in the downpour.  I was there because I was covering the game for the student newspaper.  Roland had a flask and was pretty drunk, and we stood together (it was too wet to sit down) for some time (was it ten minutes, twenty, thirty? It seemed an eternity in its awkwardness). I don’t think I drank from the flask, although he offered it to me.  But, perhaps, I took one swallow out of politeness.  Whiskey has never been my thing.  I may have said fifteen words the whole time, and was fixated on whether I should express my sorrow about his son’s death.  I couldn’t find the courage to mention the death—and felt both an idiot for not doing so and certain that was the right course as he told related anecdotes of his time in graduate school in Minnesota.  Tales of poets: Alan Tate and John Berryman.

Some years later, when his collection Stubborn, was published, I wrote to him to tell him of that day.  Why?  Because the stubbornness that his poems are built around is the relentless grief for that lost life—a grief that still haunted his every day some twenty years on.  I thought he would welcome another window into that horrible time that he clearly dwelt on much of the time in his thoughts and imagination.  I got back a short letter, one almost cold in its brevity, and its main point was that I must have mis-remembered because he would never have taken alcohol in the presence of a student and certainly wouldn’t have offered alcohol to one.  An odd memory lapse about the looser atmosphere of the early 70s, because I also remember distinctly the bottles of Almaden wine lined up on the table at the end of semester class party he sponsored for that Faulkner seminar.

My college girlfriend took Roland’s poetry writing classes and I went to several of the poetry readings that he sponsored—most memorably the one with James Wright.  Because of Roland, I memorized a number of classic English poems that second year in college, bits of which I still retain.  Hopkins’ “God’s Grandeur,” Yeats’ “Sailing to Byzantium,” most ambitiously Keats’ “Ode to a Nightingale.”  And I went to see him on trips back to DC over the years, certainly in 1979, just before taking up my first academic job at the University of Michigan, when after that I do not know, but 1979 was not the last time I saw him.

Did I see him after that exchange of letters (which would have been in 1992 or 1993)?  I don’t know. But I think not.  Certainly we never talked about it if we did meet.

I read recently an essay by Richard Ellmann in which he says every life has a turning point.  I suspect a biographer has to believe that, has to believe that a life has (assumes) a definite shape.  How else could you write a coherent biography?  I can’t identify a turning point in my life—or can identify at least ten of them.  And I am proud to think my life too various, its incidents and relationships too many, to be reduced to some single plot line.  But a catastrophe like the death of a child would, it seems to me, puts its stamp on everything, blot out so much else.

Here’s one of Roland’s poems about that turning point in his life—and the way it remained with him.

 

WHAT I HAVE TRIED TO SAY TO YOU

That there are ways to love the life you haven’t had,
ways to forgive the one you have.
That while your brother wasn’t killed
to test anyone, his death is,
somehow, allowed by the mystery
requiring our lives to have this
permanent pull at the middle.
Our lives are what they have been: unrevisable,
changed only in our responses,
if we are still ready, somehow,
for the next day, the next
person, poem, chance, even prepared,
however unready, for the next death.
Can we permanently grieve the boy
without hating what has become of him?
What has become of him?
He has returned to mystery,
the same one that is our life,
mine and yours this morning,
the continuing shapes we never see
up there, this afternoon, tomorrow:
so he is already, ahead of time,
in everything we do. I feel it, often,
that I am living my life in part for him,
not permanently dead in us, but telling
how we’d rather he had lived than not.
Remember our game of listening in the park
to hear the woods fill up with sounds,
birds, mostly, from farther and farther away
the longer we listened. He seems now
especially to have listened,
raptly, eyes closed, as if to singing,
as if he were entering the song,
and like the way he usually walked
far ahead of us or far behind –
already gone to his own music.
When I think how long it is
since he has entered all silence,
it takes me by the heart to think
those sounds like light have stayed
in whatever we are left to be.
That songs we heard those days
are from the place he’s gone away to,
a singing in the mysteries connecting us,
if we can stop and be quiet and listen.

(Easy, LSU Press, 1999)