Tag: Consciousness

Percept/Concept 2

I wrote a post sometime back that tried to sort out the relation between percepts and concepts.

Here’s the link to that post: https://jzmcgowan.com/2024/03/13/percept-concept/

The issue in that post was the relation of percepts (information taken in via the five senses) to concepts (the categories by which we identify what a percept has given to us).  Mostly (although not entirely) that post assumes that the percept comes first, followed by the judgment (assignment) of the appropriate concept.  The puzzle, in part, was that this kind of temporal sequencing is not experienced in most cases.  The percept and the concept arrive together.  I see a tree.  I don’t see some amorphous set of sense impressions and then decide they form a tree.  The percept comes already conceptualized, categorized.

There are cases where percept and concept are pried apart.  And many artists, especially since the Romantics, strive hard to separate the two, to overcome our habitual associations and expectations.  To break the crust of habit, the received categorizations of culture, is one of their top artistic goals.  Thus, “difficult” poetry strives to slow the reader down, to use words in unfamiliar ways so we have to puzzle out the meaning instead of simply swallowing it at one gulp.  The same for many modern paintings or music.  A moment of confusion, of disorientation, is deliberately created.

However, according to what has become the reigning orthodoxy in current consciousness studies, I was working with the wrong model of perception.  The new orthodoxy says 1) percept and concept cannot be pried apart, but even more consequently, 2) that concept always precedes percept.  Here’s is Andy Clark’s description of the current consensus: “the world we experience is to some degree the world we predict.  Perception itself, far from being a simple window onto the world, is permeated from the get-go by our own predictions and expectations.  It is permeated not simply in the sense that our own ideas and biases impact how we later judge things to be, but in some deeper, more primal, sense.  The perceptual process, the very machinery that keeps us in contact with the world, is itself fueled by a rich seam of prediction and expectation” (The Experience Machine: How Our Minds Predict and Shape Reality, Pantheon Books, 2023, p. 17).  “Every time we make sense of our worlds through perceptual encounters, we do so by means of both the incoming sensory signals and a rich invisible stream of knowledge-based predictions” (22).

This vision does seem very close to the classic pragmatism of Peirce and William James.  We move through the world in a kind of semi-somnolent habitual gliding.  Not closely attending, we walk, see trees, eat food, carry on conversations that move along predictable paths. In the ordinary course of events, very little surprises us, brings us up short.  All unfolds almost entirely as expected.  It takes pretty dramatic deviations from the expected to break through, to make us question what we have casually assumed to be the case. Inquiry (in the pragmatist parlance) begins from doubt. We must set about trying to figure out what we have seen, what is happening, when things don’t go as expected.

Andy Clark is sunnily optimistic about all this.  But it is easy to see how it could be given a pessimistic spin, as a writer like Flaubert (with his fierce hatred of received ideas) does.  That we process the world through our expectations explains confirmation bias and our bog-stupid inability to alter our expectations and prejudices (this latter word the exactly precise one for this state of affairs) in light of new evidence, new percepts.  We quite literally do not see what is in front of us; we see what we expect to see.

In Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions, he reports on an experiment in which the subjects are shown playing cards.  The trick is that the cards have the spades and clubs colored red, and the hearts and diamonds colored black.  Over 80% of the subjects will identify a 6 with black hearts as either a 6 of hearts or a 6 of spades.  Less than 20% will say: that’s a six with black hearts.  And increasing the time subjects were given to view the cards did not substantially change the results.  We look at something quickly, make our judgment of what it is, and move on.  Anomalies are hard for us to see.

Of course, it is hopeful that a certain percentage do recognize that something is awry, that what perception is offering does not match what was expected/predicted.  Clark sees humans as self-correcting animals, adjusting their judgments as we go along.  His model is basically one in which “errors” in prediction are registered—and then serve to alter expectations. 

Clark’s reliance on a virtuous feedback loop becomes clear when he turns to an account of action. (Again, his account chimes with classic pragmatism.)  “[S]uccessful action involves a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy.  Predicting the detailed sensory effects of a movement is what causes the movement to unfold.  By making prediction the common root of both perception and action, predictive processing (active inference) reveals a hidden unity in the workings of the mind.  Action and perception form a single whole, jointly orchestrated by the drive to eliminate errors in prediction.  . . . In other words, the idea of a completed action is what brings the actual action about” (70-71).  We are guided by our vision of consequences; we then act to bring the desired consequences about.

The feedback loop comes into play in terms of what Clark calls “precision weightings.”  “Various estimates of precision alter patterns of post-synaptic influence and so determine what (right here, right now) to rely on and what to ignore.  This is also the way brains balance the influence of sensory evidence against predictions.  In other words, precision variations control what bits of what we know and what we sense will be most influential, moment by moment, in bringing about further processing and actions.  Expressed like that, the intimacy of precision and attention is apparent.  Precision variation is what attention (a useful but somewhat nebulous concept) really is.  . . . [A]ttention is the brain adjusting its precision-weightings as we go about our daily tasks, using knowledge and sensing to their best effect.  By attending correctly, I become better able to spot and respond to whatever matters most for the task I am trying to perform.  Precision estimation is thus the heart and soul of flexible, fluid intelligence” (50). 

Although he doesn’t say this, Clark has here added “purposes” to expectations and predictions.  We attend to (notice) the elements of a situation relevant to our current purposes.  And we adjust our understanding of those situational elements (attain more precise readings of the situation) in response to the feedback received as our purposes are attained or thwarted.  So the senses (perceptions) do have their role to play; they do provide information about the situation.  But what information is taken in and how it is processed (evaluated) is guided by the prior purposes/expectations. 

Clark invokes William James briefly at this point—and accepts that this account reverses common-sense notions of the causal sequence: i.e. that we see something first, then act upon it; here, by contrast, we see something by virtue of the fact that we are looking for it in relation to our purposes/expectations.  Attention is influenced more by what we expect to see or are specifically looking for than by what is actually present in the world we encounter.  But the ability to shift attention, to move toward a more precise apprehension of the actual situation is “the heart and soul of flexible, fluid intelligence.”

A corollary of this view is that situations, in almost all cases, contain more elements than any perceiver/agent takes in. Attention is selective; we simply do not see what is neither expected nor relevant to our purposes. William James constantly stressed this “more”: the fact that our knowledge is almost always incomplete. Again, it does seem that many artists are dedicated to bringing more of a situation into view–or, at least, at bringing what has not been seen, what had been neglected by common sense (a loaded term), to our attention.

Clark does not take up the issue of just what is required to break through the crust of expectations. He only briefly considers the problems of entrenched prejudices, of failures to apprehend the real—or even the problem of bad judgments about the actual affordances of a particular situation.  He does talk of “disordered attention” (51) and “aberrant attention” (52) and considers clinical ways of intervening to redirect attention in such cases.  To my mind, however, he is over-optimistic about the ability to shift our incoming biases.

Clark also takes a very individualistic stance on the nature of our preconceptions and expectations.  He sees them as the product of individual experience much more than of socialization (however you want to conceive of the process by which individuals are provided with a set of cultural expectations and beliefs.)  And he doesn’t address the problem of the loss of flexibility as one ages.  At what point are the individual’s expectations hardened to the point where they are very hard to revise, to un-fix. 

So I have posed two questions: 1) how strong does the disconfirmation of expectations have to be to actually break through and garner attention? What kinds of shocks actually move us to doubt and inquiry (as conceived in the pragmatist model)? And 2) at what age are expectations mostly entrenched and thus resistant to revision?  An open mind is a wonderful thing in part because it is so rare.

And just as open minds are rare, so are true idiosyncratic individuals.  There is no reason to deny individual variations, but behavior and beliefs also, to a very large extent, clump.  We are all strongly influenced by our closest fellow humans, adopting their styles, beliefs, values, habits etc. 

William James famously wrote “the trail of the human serpent is over all.”  I will admit that acknowledging the conceptual overlay through which all perceptions are processed depresses me.  I am enough of a Romantic that I want, along with William Blake, to throw open the doors of perception. I don’t deny that the available evidence speaks strongly in favor of the new orthodoxy about how we process the world.  I just want to be among the twenty percent who see red spades.

Consciousness and Life

I have now read about 15 books on consciousness.  The most recent was Phillip Goff’s Consciousness and Fundamental Reality (Oxford UP, 2023 paperback; originally published in 2017).  A very bad book, easily the worst of all the ones I have read on this topic.  But, as often happens with bad books, it spurred my thinking wonderfully, since it clarified what I am willing to believe about consciousness and what speculations I find incredible (in the literal meaning of that word, i.e. something I cannot judge worthy of belief).

Goff is a panpsychist—and goes through a torturous path of posited axioms and piled up distinctions (cutting the bologna thinner and thinner, as a colleague of mine used to put it) to make his case.  Monotheism has much to answer for.  Basically, Goff is striving to be a monist because monism is more “elegant,” more parsimonious, as a theory than any account that multiplies basic entities. 

His book just confirmed me in my pluralist views.  And pushed me further toward materialism (or what in consciousness studies often gets called “physicalism.)  I am, no doubt, ill informed about the basic science here.  But I will venture to guess that one of Goff’s major problems is that he takes physics as the fundamental science relevant to his metaphysical project—a project defined by the attempt to identify the “deep nature” of “fundamental reality.”  Goff is a believer in substance—and he ends up in a recognizably Spinoza-like place (although he only mentions Spinoza once in his book.)  There is only one substance, but it manifests itself in different aspects (Spinoza’s modes) for Goff.  And since one of Goff’s axioms is that consciousness self-evidently exists, then the single substance must have some rudimentary consciousness (although he does affirm that consciousness comes in more or less elaborated forms).  In his most recent book, Why? The Purpose of the Universe (Oxford University Press, 2023), Goff substitutes “the cosmos” for God, with what only seems to me a sliver of difference between the two even as he denies belief in God.  (I base this on a podcast interview with Goff; I have not read the new book.)  You can access the podcast interview here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pHFzS8MIhK0

Enough of Goff.  What do I now believe?  I buy Goff’s insistence that the existence of consciousness is self-evident.  Consciousness is not an illusion; the phenomenon of experiencing consciousness needs to be accepted as evidence of its reality—and thus any metaphysical account of “what is” must include consciousness.

From there, accounting for the existence of consciousness leads into the question of whether it is something very different from the things that do not appear to possess consciousness.  Just about everyone out there right now hates dualism; they don’t want a metaphysical account that ends up with two radically different fundamental things: consciousness and non-consciousness.  So the alternatives seem to become: 1) reduction of consciousness to matter and its processes (physicalism) or 2) panpsychism (baking consciousness into matter from the very start). 

On the face of it, neither alternative is very attractive.  For the physicalist, the problem is that the actual physical processes by which you get from bio-chemical interactions to consciousness continue to elude us (despite assurances that date back to the 17th century that the connection will someday be uncovered).  For the panpsychist, the problem is that basic matter—stones, not to mention atoms and electrons, do not demonstrate any of the features of consciousness.  So on what basis do you claim that consciousness is somehow present in such instances of matter?

Let me start from what may be a huge misunderstanding on my part.  Still: as I understand it, when we go to the periodic table of elements, we get a plurality of instances of matter that we could say are structured the same (i.e. however you characterize atomic structure) but which are different.  A gold atom is not a hydrogen atom.  And a gold atom will interact differently with an oxygen atom than a hydrogen atom will.  So that seems to me to argue against the notion of a fundamental sameness, a monism, at the bottom of the manifested world.  Instead, we begin from a variety of things that then interact in ways that produce further variety.  Scientific laws may delineate the forms that interactions typically take—but the actual outcomes of interactions depend on which elements are interacting.  Furthermore, modern science (again as I understand it—and I could well be wrong) usually works with probabilities, not certainties.  Interactions do not always produce the same results.  There is a considerable dose of leeway, even if science can fairly accurately (over a range of cases) predict the probability of one outcome over other possible ones.  All of this, to my mind, suggests neither monism, not dualism, but pluralism.

But let’s leave physics behind.  I think it’s a big mistake on Goff’s part to take physics as the place to land in any attempt to account for consciousness or for fundamental reality.  As I see it, biology over the past fifty years has replaced physics as the science most likely to get us to the root of things.  What is most striking to me about Goff’s book is the failure to link consciousness to life.  I much prefer the various thinkers—Daniel Dennett (Freedom Evolves, Penguin,2004), Nicholas Humphrey [Sentience: The Invention of Consciousness, MIT Press, 2023), Kevin Mitchell (Free Agents: How Evolution Gave Us Free Will, Princeton UP, 2023)—who approach consciousness through an evolutionary lens. 

What does that mean?  A lot of things.  So let me list them here—and then try to discuss each of these items in turn. 1) Consciousness should be considered in relation to the ways it furthers an organism’s ability to survive and to produce descendants. 2) Consciousness should be considered within an evolutionary timeframe.  It is not static, but something that changes over time.  There is no reason to expect that it always existed (just as human beings did not always exist) and there is no reason to think it is not always in process.  Adaptation, mutation, and change never stop.  3) The crucial category for thinking about the fundamental nature of things is “life,” not atomic or sub-atomic structure or some version of quantum mechanics.  In short, biology leads us from a “substantialist” way of approaching metaphysical questions to a dynamic, process-focused way of addressing such questions.  There is not some fundamental “stuff,” but a dynamic unfolding as “stuff” interacts and is transformed over time.

OK.  Let me tackle each of these issues in turn.  First, an evolutionary perspective on consciousness.  I am mostly following Kevin Mitchell here.  Basically, consciousness is a tool for evaluation.  A living organism must evaluate its circumstances (what are threats, what are opportunities, what are the affordances) and must evaluate possible courses of action in response to those circumstances (which actions are most likely to be effective, require more of less expenditure of energy, have the least harmful side effects etc.) Self-consciousness is a way of evaluating what we can term the “internal environment.” How am I feeling, what do I want?  Since circumstances change in a non-static world, the advantage of having the flexibility consciousness provides is a very valuable evolutionary advantage.  Automatic stimulus/response mechanisms cannot adapt to different situations with the subtlety that consciousness affords. 

On another level of explanation, the evolutionary view seems to entail accepting a dualist understanding of causation.  Harkening back to Aristotle, the mechanistic efficient causation of physics now needs to be supplemented with a teleological causation acting at the level of the whole.  Basically, the idea is that efficient causation is from the bottom-up, parts interacting to create something new.  (That something new may, at times, be something larger, the product of a merger of the parts.  But that is only one possibility; efficient causes can produce any number of effects.)  A teleological cause is from the top-down.  The whole has purposes that cause certain behavior in the parts.  In evolutionary terms, the organism has an overriding purpose (survival and reproduction) that then causes the selection of certain capacities (sight, consciousness) that serve that purpose.  In the most basic terms, the organism must work against entropy, must expend energy to keep its complex systems functioning, must defy the 2nd law of thermodynamics.  Mitchell touches to some extent on this insistence that efficient cause does not rule the entire roost, but to get the full blown rewriting of our theories of causation to serve an evolutionary account of consciousness, you need to go to Terrence Deacon, Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter (Norton, 2013) and Mark Solms, The Hidden Spring: A Journey to the Source of Consciousness (Norton, 2021).  Their work leads to a cybernetic understanding of consciousness and its function within an information-processing model of living organisms.  I do not claim to comprehend this model is all its intricacies, but the basic need to establish the credibility of a non-mechanistic form of causality is clear enough.

My second issue—the non-static, dynamic nature of evolutionary time is less complex.  The big point here, for me, is that we hardly need (as the panpsychist insists) to have the psychic baked in from the very start.  Things emerge over the long, long time spans of evolution; why should it be impossible that consciousness emerges?  Improbable, yes.  But impossible, no.  If there are evolutionary good reasons for consciousness to emerge, then there are forces to work to make that happen.  The real improbability is that life itself emerges.  Once life does emerge, the emergence of consciousness is less hard to understand since consciousness delivers such substantial advantages for adaptation, survival, and reproduction.  In terms or metaphysics, accepting a dynamic and long time frame moves us away from trying to identify basic entities that are there from start to finish.  New interactions of pre-existing elements create new things. 

So my third issue: life as the crucial category.  I think that here I am going to get pushed into something that looks like, most likely is, dualism.  But Goff’s book got me thinking about how intimately connected consciousness and life are—and how this intimate connection has not been explicitly addressed in the various books I have read.  Here’s what I mean: consciousness is something only living creatures have.  A stone is not conscious.  But what is a living creature?  A stab at a basic definition: a living creature is one that must take in fuel of some sort that it metabolizes to provide the energy required to keep certain life-sustaining processes going.  Digestion, consciousness, blood circulation, fighting off infections are just some of these life-sustaining processes.  And, crucially, a living creature can be defined as one that can die.  To die is to have those various processes come to an end.  No more seeking for and then ingesting fuel, no more feeling hungry, no more devising strategies for allaying hunger. 

So the dualism seems to be between something that is alive and something that is not.  And it seems as if alive things have consciousness and non-alive things do not.  Furthermore, things that were once alive can stop being alive; they die and when they die they lose consciousness.  All of which suggests to me that consciousness is produced by bio-chemical processes that require energy to occur and, since these processes can go awry in ways that do not sustain life but cause death instead, that the teleology of “life” must organize the multiple processes embodied in a living organism as it tries to ward off death.  Consciousness is just one of those processes—and even if it is more mysterious to us than the digestive system, there seems no reason to believe it is different in kind.  Hence my physicalism. 

But I am still left with a dualism between the living and the non-living.  Another way to express that dualism is to say that the processes of geology are also dynamic and non-static, but they are not processes in which natural selection (as understood by evolutionary theory) plays any role at all.  Continental drift has nothing to do with adaptation and, thus (if my thinking hasn’t gotten utterly confused at this point), can be seen as solely an outcome of efficient causes, with no involvement of teleological causes.

I will end here.  What I have said here does nothing to address the marvels and mysteries of the phenomenological experience of consciousness.  Not surprisingly, as a literary person, the phenomenology is in many ways more interesting to me. How different living creatures think and feel is fascinating. We never cease to be surprised at how differently different creatures evaluate what appears to be the same situation. Except, of course, different creatures actually notice different aspects of that situation; different things are salient for them, attract their attention. And that doesn’t even consider different desires. But I don’t know that I have yet found a good way to even begin to sort out the complexities here.  I think we need a book titled The Varieties of Conscious Experience—a deliberate echo of William James’ The Varieties of Religious Experience.

Percept/Concept

I tried to write a post on the distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive and got completely tangled up.  So, instead, I am taking a step backward and addressing the relation between percept and concept, where I feel on surer ground.  I will follow up this post with another on fact/value.  And then, with those two pairings sorted out, I may be able to say something coherent about the cognitive/non-cognitive pairing.

So here goes.  A percept is what is offered to thought by one of the five senses.  I see or smell something.  The stimulus for the percept is, in most but not all cases, something external to myself. Let’s stick to perception of external things for the moment.  I see a tree, or smell a rose, or hear the wind whistling through the trees.  I have what Hume calls “an impression.”

I have always wanted to follow the lead of J. L. Austin in his Sense and Sensibilia.  In that little book, Austin takes on the empiricist tradition that has insisted, since Locke, that one forms a “representation” or an “idea” (that is the term Locke uses) of the perceived thing. (In the philosophical tradition, this gets called “the way of ideas.”) In other words, there is an intermediary step.  One perceives something, then forms an “idea” of it, and then is able to name, think about, or otherwise manipulate that idea.  The powers of thought and reflection depend upon this translation of the impression, of the percept, into an idea (some sort of mental entity.)  Austin, to my mind, does a good job of destroying that empiricist account, opting instead for direct perception, dispensing with the intermediary step of forming an idea–and thus appealing to some kind of “mental state” to understand perception. 

But Kevin Mitchell in Free Agents (Princeton UP, 2023) makes a fairly compelling case for raw percepts being transformed into “representations.”  First, there are the differences in perceptual capabilities from one species to another, not to mention differences among members of the same species.  If I am more far-sighted than you, I will see something different from you.  True, that doesn’t necessarily entail indirection as contrasted to direct perception.  But it does mean that the “thing itself” (the external stimuli) does not present itself in exactly the same guise to every perceiving being.  What is perceived is a co-production, created out of the interaction between perceiver and perceived.  There is no “pure” perception.  Perception is always an act that is influenced by the sensory equipment possessed by the perceiver along with the qualities of the thing being perceived. Descriptions of how human sight works makes it clear how much “work” is done upon the raw materials of perception before the “thing” is actually seen. And, of course, we know that there are colors that the color-blind cannot perceive and noises that are in most cases beyond human perceptual notice.

Second, the experiences of both memory and language speak to the existence of “representations.”  We are able to think about a perceived thing even in its absence.  To say the word “elephant” is to bring an elephant into the room even when that elephant is not physically present.  Similarly, memory represents to us things that are absent.  Thus, even if we deny that the perception of present things has an intermediary step of transforming the percept into a “representation,” it seems indubitable that we then “store” the immediate impressions in the form of representations that can be called to mind after the moment of direct impression. 

Finally, the existence of representations, of mental analogues to what has been experienced in perception, opens the door for imagination and reflection.  I can play around with what perception has offered once I have a mental representation of it.  I can, in short, think about it.  The sheer weight of facticity is sidestepped once I am inside my head instead of in direct contact with the world.  A space, a distance, is opened up between perceiver and perceived that offers the opportunity to explore options, to consider possible actions upon, manipulations of, what the world offers.  Representation provides an ability to step back from the sensory manifold and take stock.

So it would seem that Austin’s appealing attempt to dispense with the elaborate machinery of empiricist psychology won’t fly.  As accounts of how human vision works show, too much is going on to make a “direct” account of perception true to how perception actually works. Stimuli sensed by the senses are “processed” before being registered, not directly apprehended.

So the next issue is what “registering” or “apprehending” consist of.  But first a short digression.  We typically think of perception as the encounter with external things through one of the five senses.  But we can also perceive internal states, like a headache or sore muscle.  In those cases, however, perception does not seem to be tied to one of the five senses, but to some sort of ability to monitor one’s internal states.  Pain and pleasure are the crudest terms for the signals that trigger an awareness of internal states.  More broadly, I think it fair to say that the emotions in their full complex panoply are the markers of internal well-being (or its opposite or the many way stations between absolute euphoria and abject despair).  Emotions are both produced by the body (sometimes in relation to external stimuli, sometimes in relation to internal stimuli) and serve as the signal for self-conscious registering of one’s current states.  It’s as if a tree was not just a tree, but also a signal of “tree-ness.”  Anger is both the fact of anger and a signal to the self of its state of mind in response to some stimuli.  Certain things in the world or some internal state triggers an emotion—and then the emotion offers a path to self-awareness.  So there appears to be an “internal sense capacity,” ways of monitoring internal states and “apprehending” them that is parallel to the ways the five traditional senses provide for apprehending the external world. 

What, then, does it mean to “apprehend” something once the senses have provided the raw materials of an encounter with that thing?  Following Kant, apprehension requires a “determinate judgment.”  The percept is registered by the self when the percept is conceptualized.  Percept must become concept in order to be fully received.  To be concrete: I see the various visual stimuli that the tree offers, but I don’t apprehend the tree until I subsume this particular instance of a tree into the general category/concept “tree.”  I “recognize” the tree as a tree when I declare “that’s a tree.”  The tree in itself, standing there in the forest, does not know itself as a tree.  The concept “tree” is an artifact of human language and human culture.  Percepts only become occasions for knowledge when they are married to concepts.  Pure, non-conceptualized, percepts are just raw material—and cannot be used by human thought.  In other words, back to the representation notion.  Until what perception offers is transformed into a representation, it is unavailable for human apprehension, for being taken up by the human subject as part of its knowledge of the world. (Of course, famously in Kant, this yields the distinction between our representations and the “thing in itself.” The cost of “the way of ideas”–the cost that Austin was trying to overcome–is this gap in our knowledge of the world, our inability to see things independently of the limitations of human perceptual and conceptual equipment. Science attempts to overcome these limitations by using non-human instruments of perception (all those machines in our hospitals), but even science must acknowledge that what a machine registers, just like what a human registers, is a representation that is shaped by the nature of the representing apparatus.)

Determinate judgment appears to be instantaneous.  At least in the case of the encounter with most external things.  I see a tree and, without any discernible time lapse, identify it as a tree.  I have no awareness of processing the sensory signals and then coming to a judgment about what category the seen thing belongs to.  Percept and concept are cemented together.  Of course, there are some cases where I can’t at first make out what it is before me.  The lighting is bad, so I see a shape, but not enough more to determine what the thing is.  Such cases do indicate there is a distinction between percept and concept.  But in the vast majority of cases it is just about impossible to pry them apart.

For many artists from Blake on, the effort to pry the two apart is a central ambition.  The basic idea is that we see the world through our conceptual lenses—and thus fail to apprehend it in its full richness, its full sensual plenitude.  We filter out the particulars of this tree as we rush to assimilate the singular instance to the general category.  Thus painters strive to make us see things anew (cubism) or to offer ambiguous items that can’t be immediately or readily identified (surrealism).  They try to drive a wedge between percept and concept. “No ideas but in things,” proclaims William Carlos Williams—and this hostility to ideas, to their preeminence over things (over percepts), is shared by many modern artists.

One of the mysteries of the percept/concept pairing is the relative poverty of our linguistic terms to describe percepts.  We can in most cases quickly identify the tree as a tree, and we can certainly say that the tree’s leaves are green in the spring and rust-colored in the fall.  But more precise linguistic identification of colors eludes us.  We can perceive far more variations in colors than we can describe.  Hence the color chips at any hardware store, which offer 45 variants of the color we crudely call “blue” and invent fanciful names to distinguish each different shade from the rest.  The same, of course, holds for smells and for emotions.  We have a few, very crude terms for smell (pungent, sharp) but mostly can only identify smells in terms of the objects that produce such smells.  It smells flowery, or like hard boiled egg.  The same with taste.  Aside from sweet, sour, sharp, we enter the world of simile, so that descriptions of wine notoriously refer to things that are not wine. Notes of black currant, leather, and tobacco.  And when it comes to emotions we are entirely at sea—well aware that our crude generalized terms (love, anger, jealousy) get nowhere near to describing the complexities of what one feels.  Thus some artists (Updike comes to mind) specialize in elaborating on our descriptive vocabularies for physical and emotional percepts.  Thus a whole novel might be devoted to tracing the complexities of being jealous, to strive to get into words the full experience of that emotional state.

In any case, the paucity of our linguistic resources for describing various percepts, even in cases where the distinction between the percepts is obvious to us (as in the case of gradients of color), shows (I  believe) that there are ordinary cases where percept and concept are distinct.  We don’t immediately leap to judgment in every case.  Now, it is true that I conceptualize the various shades of blue as “color” and even as “blue.”  But I do not thereby deny that the various shades on the color chip are also different, even though I have no general category to which I can assign those different shades. 

Two more puzzles here.  The first is Wittgensteinian.  I had forgotten, until going through this recently with my granddaughter, how early children master color.  By 18 months, she could identify the basic colors of things.  Multiple astounding things here.  How did she know we were referring to color and not to the thing itself when we call a blue ball “blue”?  What were we pointing out to her: the color or the thing?  Yet she appeared to have no trouble with that possible confusion.  Except.  For a while she called the fruit “orange” “apples.”  It would seem that she could not wrap her head around the fact that the same word could name both a color and a thing.  She knew “orange” as a color, so would not use that word to name a thing.  Even more amazing than sorting colors from things, was her accuracy in identifying a thing’s color.  Given sky blue and navy blue, she would call both “blue.”  A little bit later on (two or three months) she learned to call one “light blue” and the other “dark blue.”  But prior to that distinction, she showed no inclination to think the two were two different colors.  And she didn’t confuse them with purple or any other adjacent color.  So how is it that quite different percepts get tossed into the same category with just about no confusion (in relation to common usage) at all? It would seem more obvious to identify sky blue and dark blue as two different colors.

The second puzzle might be called the ”good enough” conundrum.  I walk in the forest and see “trees.”  The forester sees a number of specific species—and very likely also singles out specific trees as “sick” or of a certain age.  His judgments are very, very different from mine—and do not suffer from the paucity of my categorical terms.  Similarly, the vintner may rely on an almost comical similes to describe the taste of the wine, but I do not doubt that his perceptions are more intense and more nuanced than mine.  A chicken/egg question here about whether having the concepts then sharpens the percepts—or if sharper percepts then generate a richer vocabulary to describe them.  Or the prior question: do we only perceive with the acuity required by our purposes?  My walk in the woods is pleasant enough for me without my knowing which specific types of trees and ferns I am seeing.  What we “filter out,” in other words, is not just a function of the limitations of our perceptual equipment, or the paucity of our concepts/vocabulary, but also influenced by our purposes.  We attend to what we need to notice to achieve something. 

Push this last idea just a bit and we get “pragmatism” and its revision of the empiricist account of perception and the “way of ideas.”  The pragmatist maxim says that our “conception” of a thing is our understanding of its consequences.  That is, we perceive things in relation to the futures that thing makes possible.  Concepts are always dynamic, not static.  They categorize what perception offers in terms of how one wants to position oneself in the world.  Percept/concept is relational—and at issue is the relations I wish to establish (or maintain) between myself and what is “out there” (which includes other people.) 

Back to the artists.  The repugnance many artists (as well as other people) feel toward pragmatism stems from this narrowing down of attention, of what might be perceived.  Focused (in very Darwinian fashion) upon what avails toward the organism’s well-being, the pragmatist self only perceives, only attends to, that which it can turn to account.  It thereby misses much of what is in the world out there.  The artists want to fling open the “doors of perception” (to quote Blake)—and see pragmatism as a species of utilitarianism, a philosophy that notoriously reduces the range of what “matters” to humans as well as reducing the motives for action to a simple calculus of avoiding pain and maximizing pleasure.  To categorize percepts immediately into two bins–these things might benefit me, these things are potentially harmful—is to choose to live in a diminished, perversely impoverished world.

Of course, Dewey especially among the “classic” pragmatists worked hard to resist the identification of pragmatism to a joyless and bare-bones utilitarianism.  The key to this attempt is “qualia”—a term that is also central in the current philosophical debates about consciousness.  “Qualia” might be defined as the “feel of things.”  I don’t just see trees as I walk in the woods.  I also experience a particular type of pleasure—one that mixes peacefulness, the stimulus/joy of physical exertion, an apprehension of beauty, a diffuse sense of well-being etc.  “Consciousness” (as understood in everyday parlance) registers that pleasure. Consciousness entails that I not only feel the pleasure but can also say to myself that I am feeling this pleasure.  Percepts, in other words, are accompanied by specific feelings that are those percept’s “qualia.” And through consciousness we can register the fact of experiencing those feelings.

The relation of concepts to “qualia” is, I think, more complex—and leads directly to the next post on the fact/value dyad.  A concept like “fraud” does seem to me to have its own qualia.  Moral indignation is a feeling—and one very likely to be triggered by the thought of fraud.  Perhaps (I don’t know about this) only a specific instance of fraud, not just the general concept of it, is required to trigger moral indignation.  But I don’t think so.  The general idea that American financiers often deploy fraudulent practices seems to me enough to make me feel indignant.

On the other hand, the general concept of “tree” does not seem to me to generate any very specific qualia.  Perhaps a faint sense of approval.  Who doesn’t like trees?  But pretty close to neutral.  The issues, in short, are whether “neutral” percepts  or concepts are possible.  Or do all percepts and concepts generate some qualia, some feelings that can be specified?  And, secondly, are all qualia related to judgments of value?  If we mostly and instantaneously make a judgment about what category a percept belongs to (what concept covers this instance), do we also in most cases and instantaneously judge the “value” of any percept?  That’s what my next post on fact/value will try to consider.

Notes on Consciousness

I have been reading fairly extensively in the literature on consciousness.  Stuff written over the past thirty years by philosophers and neuro-biologists.  This post simply aims to get down a few specifics about what consciousness is.

This post is derived from two sources: Nicholas Humphrey, Sentience: The Invention of Consciousness (MIT Press, 2023) and Walter Veit, A Philosophy for the Science of Animal Consciousness (Routledge, 2023).  Both Humphrey and Veit are Darwinians who aim to give an account of how consciousness emerged in the course of evolutionary history.  I may take up their Darwinism (which is problematic in my eyes) in a later post.  For now I just want to get to how they describe consciousness, since I think they are both admirably clear on that issue and basically convincing.  I don’t presume to assess whether they are right.  Neither of them (and as far as my reading goes no one else in the world either) has a slam dunk physiological/neurochemical account of consciousness.  Instead, they both rely on a phenomenological description (what consciousness feels like and is experienced as) and a functional description (what consciousness does).

Let’s start with Veit.  He offers five fundamental functions for consciousness:

1) sensory experience.  Consciousness entails being able to process various stimuli that originate outside the organism as well as internal stimuli (such as the sensation of hunger);

2) evaluative. Consciousness provides the ability of an organism to evaluate its environment and react accordingly.  That is, the organism does not just receive sensory signals, but also evaluates them.

3) the integration of experiences in the present moment.  Consciousness unifies; it takes incoming signals that might be visual, auditory, scents etc. and organizes them into an holistic understanding of the present, of what is before the organism and how its various components stand in relation to one another. 

4) the integration of experience across time.  Consciousness also unifies across time, weaving together the various experiences at specific moments into a history (or narrative) that specifies the relations between the particulars of individual experiences.  (I find this function dubious.  Or, better, I would not make such an easy assumption of unity, even if the effort to unify does exist.  However, it also seems to me that efforts to unify are also more than happy to dismiss various experiences as irrelevant within certain narrative frames.  So, yes, we deploy narratives to organize experiences over time, but I don’t think of the narratives as holistic in the sense of incorporating everything.  Lots of stuff doesn’t fit with lots of other stuff, even as some things do go together.)

5) Self-consciousness.  This, of course, is the biggie, the holy grail of consciousness studies.  How to explain its existence—either by specifying its function in a Darwinian account or by providing a bio-chemical account of its existence.  It is a matter of faith for just about everyone writing about consciousness that there is a material, bio-chemical cause of consciousness. Materialism (no non-material facts or substances; thus consciousness must be a material thing) and naturalism (everything that exists does so–and originates–within a natural frame; nothing extraneous to nature) are the default positions for 95% of contemporary philosophers and scientists. But no one has come particularly close to providing such a materialistic account of consciousness, so that a skeptic like Colin McGinn argues that no such account is likely to be given within (to pick an arbitrary number) the next 100 years.  Materialism, in other words, is an unproved axiom, an item of faith that gets the whole game rolling.

Humphrey is good at describing self-consciousness.  He zeroes in on “sensations” and “qualia.”  He writes:  “Sensations are basically mental states . . . that track what’s happening at our sense organs.. . . They provide us, as subjects, with information about the quality of the sensory stimulus, its distribution and intensity, its bodily location, and–especially—how we evaluate it: the pain is in my toe and horrible; the red light is at my eyes and stirs me up. But ‘tracking’ this information is only half the story.  For, as we can each of us attest, sensations have a qualitative dimension that sets them apart from all other mental states and attitudes.  There’s something that our pains, smells, sights, and so on have in common that our thoughts, beliefs, wishes and so on don’t”(2).  That something extra is what Humphrey (following common philosophical usage) calls “qualia.”  Sights and smells have a bodily dimension that beliefs and wishes seem to lack. (I think this statement wrong, as I will discuss below.) Consciousness for Humphrey is tied to the ability to track, to register, the “feel” of sensations, to not only see the Van Gogh painting, but to register the sensation that accompanies seeing it. 

Qualia, then, refers to the “phenomenal quality” of sensations. (page 3).  Which leads Humphrey (for a variety of reasons that are generated by empirical studies of things like “blind sight”) to distinguish between “cognitive consciousness” and “phenomenal consciousness.”  There is plenty of evidence that most organisms can process and then respond to information provided by their senses.  But for Humphrey at least there is not evidence that starfish have any consciousness of the “feel” of perceptual experience even as they do respond to sensory input.  For biological reasons, he thinks phenomenal consciousness is only available to warm-blooded animals. 

He tells us that “consciousness of the kind we are talking about” is present when “sensations [are] represented as having phenomenal properties” (139).

Here’s Humphries three stages of consciousness; he thinks they are evolutionary stages even as there are also organisms in 2023 who are living examples of each stage.  “(a) First came sentition—an evaluative motor response to sensory stimulation. 9b) Then came sensation, when animals discovered how to monitor this response so as to arrive at a mental representation of what the stimulations means to them. [Cognitive consciousness.] (c) Then, once the process was privatized and feedback loops established, came phenomenal sensation, with the representation taking on a whole new look” (146).

He elaborates: stage one includes “animals with elementary uncentralized nervous systems, whose behavior is largely reflex and does not involve creative processing of information: for example, sea anemones, starfish, earthworms, slugs” (146).

Stage two are the “’Sub-Sentients.’ They do form mental representations of sensory stimulation and what it means but their sensations lack a phenomenal dimension.  I would expect this group to include animals with developed brains that may be capable of intelligent behavior that requires cognitive consciousness.  . . . They will, however, have a limited sense of themselves as individuals and will not attribute selfhood or mental states to others; for example, honeybees, octopuses, goldfish, frogs” (147).

Finally, at stage three, we get the “true ‘Sentients.’  They uniquely represent what’s happening at their sense organs as having phenomenal depth.  . . . They will be highly intelligent, especially in the social sphere, and have a strong sense of their own individual selfhood; for example: dogs, chimpanzees. parrots, humans” (147).

Note that Humphrey thinks “privatization” is a crucial step toward full phenomenal consciousness. There must be the sense of my sensation and its “feel” as belonging to me.  It’s my pain, not yours.  But, of course, we can say the same about my thoughts, beliefs, wishes, and desires.  It seems odd to claim wishes and beliefs don’t have a “feel” attached to them.  Surely, there is a sensation that has a phenomenal quality attached to it when I feel jealous or in love or believe in my country right or wrong.  And even though it is difficult, we like to think that evaluation (and subsequent revision) of our beliefs and desires is possible, just as we evaluate (and sometimes revise) what we take to be sensory information. 

Humphrey, with his privatization thesis, is strongly committed to self-consciousness. Many of those who write about consciousness take the more Humean position that the “self” is, at the very least, problematic.  There is no underlying substance or thing to the temporal flow of sensations, of experience.  But Humphrey appears to believe that you can’t have phenomenal awareness unless there is a self to whom the sensations that are registered belongs.  I think it fair to say, although he never explicitly says this, that his position is that there is no phenomenal consciousness without selfhood.  Phenomenal consciousness is a necessary condition of selfhood (as I understand his work). Maybe better to say that phenomenal consciousness creates selfhood. Where phenomenal consciousness is, the self will also be. No phenomenal consciousness without a self accompanying it. Pushing back a bit from the entanglement of phenomenal consciousness with selfhood, all kinds of environmental and biological things have to be in place for phenomenal consciousness to emerge in evolutionary history and to be present in organisms today.    That’s Humphrey’s position.

Veit would seem equally committed to a fairly robust notion of the self.  Once he assigns consciousness the task of unifying experiences across time, he is flying in the face of Humean atomism.  And, of course, Veit accepts without much discussion the basic idea of “self-consciousness.”  This is Nagel’s famous “what it feels like to be a bat.”  We don’t only have a sensation related to eating a taco; we also have a sensation related to being one’s self.  My selfhood has a “feel” to it—and the ability to register and reflect on that “feel” is part of what it is to be conscious.  Consciousness is of the self as well as of things that exist outside of and apart from my body. 

I am just reporting here.  I don’t have enough footing in this whole field to even know what I think is true and what I think dubious.  Veit’s five-fold list of functions seems useful to me just because it puts some flesh on the bones, at least points us to some of the capabilities we would be talking about when we appeal to consciousness.  And Humphrey’s focus on qualia, on the phenomenal, usefully specifies the on-the-ground experience that undergirds the assertion that consciousness exists in the face of skeptics who think it does not.  (Hume may have been skeptical about the self; but he was not skeptical about consciousness; his very distinction between “impressions” and “ideas” presupposes consciousness as the faculty that works upon the “impressions” offered by the encounter with the world.)

One final point for now.  Bentham said the only relevant question to ask when developing a hierarchy of beings, from the “lowest” forms to the “higher”, was whether a given being could suffer.  All the rest was sophistry in his view.  Our relation to other entities should be governed by their ability to suffer.  We can do whatever we want to stones because they are insensate. But if clams and goldfish experience pain as something akin to the unpleasant experience we call pain, then we have as absolute an obligation to avoid inflicting pain on them as we do on a two year old human.  Nothing in Humphrey’s distinction between stage two and stage three animals suggests that stage two animals are incapable of suffering.  The stage one case is a bit more ambiguous; I don’t know what he would say about earthworms and pain.