One quick addendum to the last post—and to Bertrand Russell’s comment about how the traditionalist is allowed all kinds of indignation that the reformer is not. What’s with the ubiquity of death threats against anyone who offends the right wing in the United States? That those who would change an established social practice/pattern, no matter how unjust or absurd, deserve a death sentence is, to all appearances, simply accepted by the radical right. So, just to give one example, the NC State professor who went public with his memories of drinking heavily with Brett Kavanaugh at Yale immediately got death threats—as did some of his colleagues in the History Department. Maybe you could say that snobbish contempt for the “deplorables” is the standard left wing response to right wingers—just as predictable as right wingers making death threats. But contempt and scorn are not solely the prerogative of the left, whereas death threats do seem only mobilized by the right.
Which does segue, somewhat, into today’s topic, which was to take up David Graeber’s alternative way of explaining the grand canyon between the left and right in today’s America. His first point concerns what he calls “moral envy.” “By ‘moral envy,’ I am referring here to feelings of envy and resentment directed at another person, not because that person is wealthy, or gifted, or lucky, but because his or her behavior is seen as upholding a higher moral standard than the envier’s own. The basic sentiment seems to be ‘How dare that person claim to be better than me (by acting in a way that I do indeed acknowledge is better than me?”” (Bullshit Jobs: A Theory [Simon and Schuster, 2018], 248). The most usual form this envy takes, in my experience, is the outraged assertion that someone is a “hypocrite.” The right wing is particularly addicted to this claim about liberal do-gooders. The liberals, in their view, claim to be holier than thou, but know what side their bed is feathered on, and do quite well for themselves. They wouldn’t be sipping lattes and driving Priuses if they weren’t laughing their way to the bank. Moral envy, then, is about bringing everyone down to the same low level of behavior—and thus (here I think Graeber is right) entails a covert acknowledgement that the general run of behavior is not up to our publicly stated moral aspirations. So we don’t like the people who make the everyday, all-too-human fact of the gap between our ideals and our behavior conspicuous. Especially when their behavior indicates that the gap is not necessary. It is actually possible to act in a morally admirable manner.
But then Graeber goes on to do something unexpected—and to me convincing—with this speculation about moral envy. He ties it to jobs. Basically, the argument goes like this: some people get to have meaningful jobs, ones for which it is fairly easy to make the case that “here is work worth doing.” Generally, such work involves actually making something or actually providing a needed service to some people. The farmer and the doctor have built-in job satisfaction insofar as what they devote themselves to doing requires almost no justification—to themselves or to others. (This, of course, doesn’t preclude all kinds of dissatisfactions with factors that make their jobs needlessly onerous or economically precarious.)
Graeber’s argument in Bullshit Jobs is that there are not enough of the meaningful jobs to go around. As robots make more of the things that factory workers used to make and as agricultural labor also requires far fewer workers than it once did, we have not (as utopians once predicted and as Graeber still believes is completely possible) rolled back working hours. Instead, we generated more and more bullshit jobs—jobs that are make-work in some cases (simply unproductive in ways that those who hold the job can easily see) or, even worse, jobs that are positively anti-productive or harmful (sitting in office denying people’s welfare or insurance claims; telemarketing; you can expand the list.) In short, lots of people simply don’t have access to jobs that would allow them to do work that they, themselves, morally approve of.
Graeber’s point is that the people who hold these jobs know how worthless the jobs are. But they rarely have other options—although the people he talks to in his book do often quit these soul-destroying jobs. The political point is that the number of “good” jobs, i.e. worthwhile, meaningful jobs is limited. And the people who have those jobs curtail access to them (through professional licensing practices in some cases, through networking in other cases). There is an inside track to the good jobs that depends, to a very large extent, on being to the manor/manner born. Especially for the jobs that accord upper-middle-class status (and almost guarantee that one will be a liberal), transmission is generational. This is the “opportunity hoarding” that Richard Reeves speaks about in his 2017 book, Dream Hoarders. The liberal professional classes talk a good game about diversity and meritocracy, but they basically keep the spots open for their kids. Entry into that world from the outside is very difficult and very rare.
To the manner born should also be taken fairly literally. Access to the upper middle class jobs still requires the detour of education–and how to survive (and even thrive) at an American university is an inherited trait. Kids from the upper middle class are completely at home in college, just as non-middle-class kids are so often completely at sea. Yes, school can be a make-it and a break-it, a place where an upper class kid falls off the rails and place where the lower class kid finds a ladder she manages to climb. But all the statistics, as well as my own experience as a college teacher for thirty years, tell me that the exceptions are relatively rare. College is a fairly difficult environment to navigate–and close to impossibly difficult for students to whom college’s idiolects are not a native language.
So two conclusions. 1. It is a mixture of class resentment and moral envy that explains the deep animus against liberal elites on the part of non-elites—an animus that, as much as does racism in my opinion, explains why the abandoned working class of our post-industrial cities has turned to the right. As bad as (or, at least, as much as) their loss of economic and social status has been their loss of access to meaningful work. Put them into as many training sessions as you want to transition them to the jobs of the post-industrial economy, you are not going to solve their acute knowledge that these new jobs suck when compared to their old jobs in terms of basic worth. So they resent the hell out of those who still hold meaningful jobs—and get well paid for those jobs and also have the gall to preach to them about tolerance and diversity. 2. It is soul-destroying to do work you cannot justify as worth doing. And what is soul-destroying will lead to aggression, despair, rising suicide rates, drug abuse, and susceptibility to right-wing demagogues. Pride in one’s work is a sine non qua of a dignified adult life.